Ernildo Stein
Perguntamos: que é isto…? Em grego isto é: ti estin. A questão relativa ao que algo seja permanece, todavia, multívoca. Podemos perguntar, por perguntar, por exemplo: que é aquilo lá longe? Obtemos então a resposta: uma árvore. A resposta consiste em darmos o nome a uma coisa que não conhecemos exatamente.
Podemos, entretanto, questionar mais: que é aquilo que designamos “árvore”? Com a questão agora posta avançamos para a proximidade do ti estin grego. E aquela forma de questionar desenvolvida por Sócrates, Platão e Aristóteles. Estes perguntam, por exemplo: Que é isto — o belo? Que é isto — o conhecimento? Que é isto — a natureza? Que é isto — o movimento?
Agora, porém, devemos prestar atenção para o fato de que nas questões acima não se procura apenas uma delimitação mais exata do que é natureza, movimento, beleza; mas é preciso cuidar para que ao mesmo tempo se dê uma explicação sobre o que significa o “que”, em que sentido se deve compreender o ti. Aquilo que o ‘que’ significa se designa o quid est, to quid: a quidditas, a quididade. Entretanto, a quidditas se determina diversamente nas diversas épocas da filosofia. Assim, por exemplo, a filosofia de Platão é uma interpretação característica daquilo que quer dizer o ti. Ele significa precisamente a ideia. O fato de nós, quando perguntamos pelo ti, pelo quid, nos referimos à “ideia” não é absolutamente evidente. Aristóteles dá uma outra explicação do ti que Platão. Outra ainda dá Kant e também Hegel explica o ti de modo diferente. Sempre se deve determinar novamente aquilo que é questionado através do fio condutor que representa o ti, o quid, o “que”. Em todo caso: quando, referindo-nos à filosofia, perguntamos: que é isto?, levantamos uma questão originariamente grega. (1999, p. 30)
Wilde & Kluback
We ask, “what is that?” In Greek this sounds ti estin (what is it?). The question of what something is, however, has more than one meaning. We can ask, “what is that over there in the distance?” We receive the answer, “a tree.” The answer consists in the fact that (35) we name a thing which we do not clearly recognize.
We can, however, ask further, “what is that which we call a ‘tree’?” With the question now posited we are already approaching the Creek ti estin (what is it?). It is this form of questioning which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle developed. They ask, for example, “What is the beautiful? What is knowledge? What is Nature? What is movement?”
Now we must, however, be careful that in the questions just mentioned not only a more exact delimitation is sought of what Nature, movement, or beauty is, but also that, at the same time, an interpretation is given of what the “what” means, in what sense the ti (what) is to be understood. That which “what” means is called the quid est, to (the) quid, the quiddity, the whatness. However, the quiddity is determined differently in the various periods of philosophy. Thus, for example, the philosophy of Plato is a specific interpretation of what the what signifies, namely the idea. (37)
That we mean the idea when we ask about the ti and and the quid is by no means to be taken as a matter of course. Aristotle gives an interpretation of the ti different from that of Plato. Kant gives another interpretation of the ti, Hegel still another. That which is asked each time by means of the clues of the ti, the quid, the “what,” is to be newly determined each time. In every case when, in regard to philosophy, we ask, “what is that?” then we are asking an originally Greek question. (p. 35-39)
Original
Wir fragen: was ist das …? Dies lautet griechisch: τί έστιν. Die Frage, was etwas sei, bleibt jedoch mehrdeutig. Wir können fragen: was ist das dort in der Ferne? Wir erhalten die Antwort: ein Baum. Die Antwort besteht darin, daß wir einem Ding, das wir nicht genau erkennen, seinen Namen geben.
Wir können jedoch weiter fragen: Was ist das, was wir »Baum« nennen? Mit der jetzt gestellten Frage kommen wir schon in die Nähe des griechischen τί έστιν. Es ist diejenige Form des Fragens, die Sokrates, Platon und Aristoteles entfaltet haben. Sie fragen z. B.: Was ist dies — das Schöne? Weis ist dies — die Erkenntnis? Was ist dies — die Natur? Was ist dies — die Bewegung?
Nun müssen wir aber darauf achten, daß in den soeben genannten Fragen nicht nur eine genauere Umgrenzung dessen gesucht wird, was Natur, was Bewegung, was Schönheit ist, sondern: daß auch zugleich eine Auslegung darüber gegeben wird, was das »Was« bedeutet, in welchem Sinne das τί zu verstehen ist. Man nennt dasjenige, was das Was bedeutet, das quid est, τό quid: die quidditas, die Washeit. Indessen wird die quidditas in den verschiedenen Epochen der Philosophie verschieden bestimmt. So ist z. B. die Philosophie Platons eine eigenartige Interpretation dessen, was das τί meint. Es meint nämlich die ιδέα. Daß wir, wenn wir nach dem τί, nach dem quid fragen, dabei die »Idea« meinen, ist keineswegs selbstverständlich. Aristoteles gibt eine andere (12) Auslegung des τί als Platon. Eine andere Auslegung des τί gibt Kant, eine andere Hegel. Was am Leitfaden des τί, des quid, des Was jeweils gefragt ist, bleibt jedesmal neu zu bestimmen. In jedem Falle gilt: wenn wir in bezug auf die Philosophie fragen: Was ist das?, dann fragen wir eine ursprünglich griechische Frage. (p. 11-12)