The ‘DECEASED’ [Der “Verstorbene”] as distinct from the dead person [dem Gestorbenen], has been torn away from those who have ‘remained behind’ [den “Hinterbliebenen”], and is an object of ‘concern’ in the ways of funeral rites, interment, and the cult of ‘graves. And that is so because the DECEASED, in his kind of Being, is ‘still more’ than just an item of equipment, environmentally ready-to-hand, about which one can be concerned. In tarrying alongside him in their mourning and commemoration, those who have remained behind are with him, in a mode of respectful solicitude. Thus the relationship-of-Being which one has towards the dead is not to be taken as a concernful Being-alongside something ready-to-hand. BTMR §47
In such Being-with the dead [dem Toten], the DECEASED himself is no longer factically ‘there’. However, when we speak of “Being-with”, we always have in view Being with one another in the same world. The DECEASED has abandoned our ‘world’ and left it behind. But in terms of that world [Aus ihr her] those who remain can still be with him. BTMR §47
The greater the phenomenal appropriateness with which we take the no-longer-Dasein of the DECEASED, the more plainly is it shown that in such Being-with the dead, the authentic Being-come-to-an-end [Zuendegekommensein] of the DECEASED is precisely the sort of thing which we do not experience. Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man ‘suffers’. The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just ‘there alongside’. BTMR §47
[SZ:239] And even if, by thus Being there alongside, it were possible and feasible for us to make plain to ourselves ‘psychologically’ the dying of Others, this would by no means let us grasp the way-to-be which we would then have in mind – namely, coming-to-an-end. We are asking about the ontological meaning of the dying of the person who dies, as a possibilityof-Being which belongs to his Being. We are not asking about the way in which the DECEASED has Dasein-with or is still-a-Dasein [Nochdaseins] with those who are left behind. If death as experienced in Others is what we are enjoined to take as the theme for our analysis of Dasein’s end and totality, this cannot give us, either ontically or ontologically, what it presumes to give. BTMR §47