In connection with our first preliminary sketch of Being-in (See Section 12) , we had to contrast Dasein with a way of Being in space which we call “insideness” [Inwendigkeit]. This expression means that an entity which is itself extended is closed round [umschlossen] by the extended boundaries of something that is likewise extended. The entity inside [Das inwendig Seiende] and that which closes it round are both present-at-hand in space. Yet even if we delay that Dasein has any such insidencss in a spatial receptacle, this does not in principle exclude it from having any spatiality at all, but merely keeps open the way for seeing the kind of spatiality which is constitutive for Dasein. This must now be set forth. But inasmuch as any entity within-the-world is likewise in space, its spatiality will have an ontological connection with the world. We must therefore determine in what sense space is a constituent for that world which has in turn been characterized as an item in the structure of Being-in-the-world. In particular we must show how the aroundness of the environment, the specific spatiality of entities encountered in the environment, is founded upon the worldhood of the world, while contrariwise the world, on its part, is not present-at-hand in space. Our study of Dasein’s spatiality and the way in which the world is spatially determined will take its departure from an analysis of what is ready-to-hand in space within-the-world. We shall consider three topics: 1. the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world (Section 22); 2. the spatiality of Being-in-the-world (Section 23); 3. space and the spatiality of Dasein (Section 24). [SZ:102] BTMR §21
From what has been said we can see already that a state-of-mind is very remote from anything like coming across a psychical condition by the kind of apprehending which first turns round and then back. Indeed it is so far from this, that only because the “there” has already been disclosed in a state-of-mind can immanent reflection come across ‘Experiences’ at all. The ‘bare mood’ discloses the “there” more primordially, but correspondingly it closes it off more stubbornly than any not-perceiving. BTMR §29
That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein. Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. Fear always reveals Dasein in the Being of its “there”, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness. If we fear about our house and home, this cannot be cited as an instance contrary to the above definition of what we fear about; for as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is in every case concernful Being-alongside. Proximally and for the most part, Dasein is in terms of what it is concerned with. When this is endangered, Being-alongside is threatened. Fear discloses Dasein predominantly in a privative way. It bewilders us and makes us ‘lose our heads’. Fear closes off our endangered Being-in, and yet at the same time lets us see it, so that when the fear has subsided, Dasein must first find its way about again. BTMR §30
Idle talk, which closes things off in the way we have designated, is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein’s understanding when that understanding has been uprooted. But idle talk does not occur as a condition which is present-at-hand in something present-at-hand: idle talk has been uprooted existentially, and this uprooting is constant. Ontologically this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is – as Being-in-the-world – cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached [in einer Schwebe]; yet in so doing, it is always alongside the world, with Others, and towards itself. To be uprooted in this manner is a possibility-of-Being only for an entity whose disclosedness is constituted by discourse as characterized by understanding and states-of-mind – that is to say, for an entity whose discloscdness, in such an ontologically constitutive state, is its “there”, its ‘in-the-world’. Far from amounting to a “not-Being” of Dasein, this uprooting is rather Dasein’s most everyday and most stubborn ‘Reality’. BTMR §35
Yet this alienation cannot mean that Dasein gets factically torn away from itself. On the contrary, this alienation drives it into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated ‘self-dissection’, tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very ‘charactcrologies’ and ‘typologies’ which it has brought about are themselves already becoming something that cannot be ‘ surveyed at a glance. This alienation closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering. It does not, however, surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity – into a possible kind of Being of itself. The alienation of falling – at once tempting and tranquillizing – leads by its own movement, to Dasein’s getting entangled [verfängt] in itself. BTMR §38
All the same, this tranquillized ‘willing’ under the guidance of the “they”, does not signify that one’s Being towards one’s potentiality-for-Being has been extinguished, but only that it has been modified. In such a case, one’s Being towards possibilities shows itself for the most part as mere wishing. In the wish Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities which not only have not been taken hold of in concern, but whose fulfilment has not even been pondered over and expected. On the contrary, in the mode of mere wishing, the ascendancy of Being-ahead-of-oneself brings with it a lack of understanding for the factical possibilities. When the world has been primarily projected as a wish-world, Being-in-the-world has lost itself inertly in what is at its disposal; but it has done so in such a way that, in the light of what is wished for, that which is at its disposal (and this is all that is ready-to-hand) is never enough. Wishing is an existential modification of projecting oneself understandingly, when such selfprojection has’ fallen forfeit to thrownness and just keeps hankering after possibilities. Such hankering closes off the possibilities; what is ‘there’ in wishful hankering turns into the ‘actual world’. Ontologically, wishing presupposes care. BTMR §41
But what kind of experience speaks for this primordial Being-guilty which belongs to Dasein? Nor may we forget the counter-question: ‘is’ guilt ‘there’ only if a consciousness of guilt gets awakened, or does not the primordial Being-guilty make itself known rather in the very fact that guilt is ‘asleep’? That this primordial Being-guilty remains proximally and for the most part undisclosed, that it is kept closed off by Dasein’s falling Being, reveals only the aforesaid nullity. Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it. And only because Dasein is guilty in the basis of its Being, and closes itself off from itself as something thrown and falling, is conscience possible, if indeed the call gives us this Being-guilty as something which at bottom we are to understand. BTMR §58
We must answer these questions affirmatively. In spite of this, they do not contain any objections to the finitude of primordial temporality – because this is something which is no longer handled by these at all. The question is not about everything that still can happen ‘in a time that goes on’, or about what kind of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter ‘out of this time’, but about how “coming-towards-oneself” is, as such, to be primordially defined. Its finitude does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characterisitic of temporalization itself. The primordial and authentic future is the ” towards-oneself” (to oneself!), existing as the possibility of nullity, the possibility which is not to be outstripped. The ecstatical character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one’s potentiality-for-Being; that is to say, the future itself is closed to one, and as such it makes possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic coming-towards-oneself is the meaning of existing in one’s ownmost nullity. In our thesis that temporality is primordially finite, we are not disputing that ‘time goes on’; we are simply holding fast to the phenomenal character of primordial temporality – a character which shows itself in what is projected in Dasein’s primordial existential projecting. BTMR §65
Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present [gegenwärtigendes Geswärtigen] – an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding “having been”. The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the sametime a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it “repetition”. But when one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a ‘positive’ ecstatical mode of one’s having been – a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost “been”, and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself – in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is [SZ:339] backing away, and thereby closes itself off too. Having forgotten [Vergessenheit] as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown Being which is one’s own; it is the temporal meaning of that Being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having-been. Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained [behalten] by the concernful making-present which awaits; and what are thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of Dasein. To such retaining there corresponds a non-retaining which presents us with a kind of ‘forgetting’ in a derivative sense. BTMR §68
Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa; for in the mode of having-forgotten, one’s having been ‘discloses’ primarily the horizon into which a Dasein lost in the ‘superficiality’ of its object of concern, can bring itself by remembering. The awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstases closes off one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, and is thus the existential condition for the possibility of irresoluteness. Though inauthentic concernful understanding determines itself in the light of making present the object of concern, the temporalizing of the understanding is performed primarily in the future. BTMR §68
The more inauthentically the Present is – that is, the more making-present comes towards ‘itself’ – the more it flees in the face of a definite potentiality-for-Being and closes it off; but in that case, all the less can the future come back to the entity which has been thrown. In the ‘leaping-away’ of the Present, one also forgets increasingly. The fact that curiosity always holds by what is coming next, and has forgotten what has gone before, is not a result that ensues only from curiosity, but is the ontological condition for curiosity itself. BTMR §68