Being and Time is an inquiry into the meaning of being (Sinn von Sein). To this short formulation of his theme Heidegger frequently adds the word überhaupt, which is difficult to translate precisely: the meaning of being as such or in general is only an approximate statement of the full theme (Sinn von SeinSein überhaupt). Fortunately, this difficulty need not worry us unduly, since Heidegger does not insist on a single formula. In an effort to make his problem concretely understandable he often reduces it to a simple, informal question, as, for example: “was heisst ‘Sein?” (SZ, 26; also KPM, 202, G3, 224, KPM(E), 153; ID, 21, ID(E), 30). Almost literally translated, the phrase means What is called “being”? Freely paraphrased, it might be rendered as What do we mean by “to be”?
From these various formulations, the core of Heidegger’s question emerges with an apparent, not to say misleading, clarity and simplicity. At first sight, we must confess, it is frankly disappointing. Heidegger claims to give philosophy a new start, but it is not at all evident where the newness of his question lies. It strikes us rather as the revival of an old question that has gone out of fashion. Even less does its fundamental character show itself on the surface. It reminds us of the kind of problems that are usually dealt with by logic, but most of all it sounds like a linguistic or a merely verbal problem. Among all the doubts and misgivings aroused by a formal statement of Heidegger’s theme, the suspicion that he might be concerned merely with the meaning of a word must evidently be the first to be allayed. (p. 5)