Chapter 1. Contextual Narrative: The Freiburg Phenomenology Workshop, 1925–1938
1.1. Eugen Fink, Arrival in Freiburg
1.2. Fink as Assistant to Husserl, First Years: 1928–1930
1.3. Fink as Assistant to, Then Collaborator with, Husserl: 1930–1934
1.4. The Final Breakthrough: 1934–1937
1.5. The Ending, and Another Beginning
Chapter 2. Orientation I: Phenomenology Beyond the Preliminary
2.1. The Phenomenological Reduction—Done Only by Being Redone
2.2. Issues That Force the Move Beyond Preliminaries: 1927–1928
2.3. The Nature of Husserl’s System
2.4. The Question of Time and the Question of the Subject: Pushing Noematization to the Limits
2.5. The Question of Time and the Question of Being
2.6. The Critique of Self-Conceptions
2.6.1. The Reduction Again: Husserl’s Own Critique of His Initiating Presentation of Phenomenology
2.6.2. The Critique of Conceptual Schemata for ‘‘Transcendental Subjectivity’’: Reconsideration by Fink
2.6.2.1. Questioning the Basic Epistemological Schema—General Points
2.6.2.2. Critique for the ‘‘Cartesian Meditations’’
2.6.2.3. Questioning the Epistemological Schema—Points for a Critique of Phenomenological ‘‘Idealism’’
2.6.2.4. Self-Conceptions and the Question of Being
2.6.2.5. The Un-Humanizing of Transcendental Subjectivity: Further Demands
2.6.2.6. First Corollary of Un-Humanization: Critique of the I
2.6.2.7. Second Corollary of Un-Humanization: Critique of Psychological-Phenomenological Parallelism and Coinciding
2.6.2.8. Third Corollary: Performance Consciousness as Clue to the Transcendental
2.7. A Final Word: Continuing Phenomenology by Reradicalizing the Issues
Chapter 3. Orientation II: Who Is Phenomenology? Husserl—Heidegger?
3.1. A Third Way Beyond Mutually Opposing Constitution and Transcendence
3.2. Transcendence in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology
3.3. The Issues in Fink’s Critique of Fundamental Ontology
3.3.1. The Phenomenological Reduction and the Ontological Difference; the A Priori Problem
3.3.2. The Basic Paradox Again, Now in Heidegger’s Analysis of Temporality; the Move Beyond Being
3.3.3. The Ontological Unattainability of the Subject
3.4. Heidegger’s Positive Contributions
3.4.1. The ‘‘I Am’’ as Finite ‘‘I Am in the World’’
3.4.2. Philosophical Explication as Construction—Even in Transcendental Phenomenology
3.5. The Term of A Priori Inquiry: ‘‘Ground’’ or ‘‘Origin’’?
Chapter 4. Fundamental Thematics I: The World
4.1. Reconsidering Entry-Level Treatment; Spinning the Ariadne Thread
4.2. The Pregivenness of the World within any Starting Point
4.3. Being Situated in the World: Captivation in the World
4.4. How the World Figures in Experience
4.4.1. Decentering the Object-Entititative Approach; Horizonality
4.4.2. Horizonality and Awareness
4.4.3. Performance Consciousness and Its Delineation
4.4.4. Putting It All Together: Reading Kant and Reading the World
4.5. Detailing the World as Horizonally Pregiven
4.6. Reflections of Fink’s Critique Work in Husserl’s ‘‘Crisis’’-Writings
4.6.1. The Pregivenness of the World
4.6.2. De-Cartesianizing Phenomenology
4.6.3. From the Object-World for Cognition to the World-as-Surround for Wakefulness
4.6.4. Identity and Difference between the Worldly and the Transcendental
Chapter 5. Fundamental Thematics II: Time
5.1. Stage 1: Fink’s Study of Time and the Bernau Manuscripts
5.1.1. The Basic Time-Problematic
5.1.1.1. The Constitutions Carried On in Temporality—General Orientation
5.1.1.2. The Constitutions of Temporality—the In-Stances
5.1.1.3. Temporality and the Problem of Origin
5.1.1.4. Temporality and the Constitution of the World
5.1.2. Stage 1: Fink’s First Revision Plan for the Bernau Manuscripts
5.1.2.1. The First Revision Plan
5.1.2.2. Prime Elements in the Bernau Manuscripts for Motivating the Move Beyond Them
5.1.2.3. Explorations into Time by Fink, 1930–1933
5.1.2.3.1. The Central Structure: The Horizontal Complex of Presenting and De-Presenting
5.1.2.3.2. Time and the Constitution of the World: The Five Horizons of Time
5.1.2.3.3. Performance Consciousness as Unthematic Horizon-Consciousness: Wakefulness
5.2. Stage 2: Reconceiving the Revision Project—The Two-Part Treatise
5.2.1. The 1934 Plan: Details
5.2.2. Husserl’s Time-Analysis in the C-Manuscripts
5.2.2.1. The Living Present as the Transcendental Proto-I
5.2.2.2. Bringing the Living Present/Transcendental Proto-I under Phenomenological Scrutiny
5.2.3. The Aporia of Time-Analysis: Reflection Across the Transcendental Divide—Fink’s Proposals
5.2.3.1. Critical Points: Presentialism
5.2.3.2. The I as Wakefulness in the Horizonality of De-Presencing
5.3. Stage 3: The Reversal and the Displacement
5.3.1. Reversal: The New Time-Book
5.3.2. Reversal Becomes Displacement: The Metaphysics of Play
Chapter 6. Fundamental Thematics III: Life and Spirit, and Entry into the Meontic
6.1. Life-Philosophy, and Life as an Idea in Phenomenology
6.2. Life-Philosophy and Phenomenology: Outline for an Essay
6.2.1. The Charges against Phenomenology, 1: Consciousness an Abstract Concept
6.2.2. The Charges against Phenomenology, 2: Phenomenology Has No ‘‘Topos,’’ No ‘‘Where’’
6.2.3. The Charges against Phenomenology, 3: The Hubris of Idealism
6.3. Explicating Phenomenology in the Context of Criticism
6.3.1. The Reduction as Precondition for Thematizing Life
6.3.2. Phenomenology as the ‘‘Metaphysics’’ of Life as Spirit
6.3.3. Life in Life-Philosophy, Life in Phenomenology
6.3.4. Life as Pathic: Nietzsche in Phenomenology
6.3.5. Philosophic/Phenomenological Reflection as an Act of Life
6.3.6. The Aporetic of Phenomenological Reflection as an Act within Life
6.4. The Double Truth of Ultimate Constitutive Explication as Meontic
6.5. Life, World, and Life-World: Husserl, Fink, and the ‘‘Crisis’’-Texts
Chapter 7. Critical-Systematic Core: The Meontic—in Methodology and in the Recasting of Metaphysics
7.1. General Points
7.1.1. The ‘‘Logic of Origin,’’ 1: Meontically Dialectical Seinssinn
7.1.2. The ‘‘Logic of Origin,’’ 2: The Living Question
7.2. The Methodological Demands of Meontic Dialectic
7.2.1. Methodological Features 1: Formal Indication
7.2.1.1. Heidegger
7.2.2. Methodological Features 2: Speculation
7.2.2.1. Speculation: Hegel and Heidegger
7.2.3. Methodological Features 3: Construction
7.2.4. Methodological Features 4: Regressive and Progressive Phenomenology; the Analytic and the Speculative
7.2.4.1. Supplementary Note: Internal and External Treatment
7.3. Primary Issues Interpretively Recast in Meontic Integration: Phenomenological Metaphysics
7.3.1. Phenomenological Metaphysics Is More Than Ontology
7.3.2. The Singularity of the World
7.3.3. Metaphysical Themes in the ‘‘Crisis’’-Project
7.3.3.1. History
7.3.3.2. Human and Transcendental Subjectivity
7.3.3.3. The Pregiven World—Finished and Done, or in an Ever-Continuing Constitution?
7.3.3.4. God
7.3.3.5. Addendum: Gnosticism, Neoplatonism, and the Meontic
7.3.4. Transition: Transcendental Articulation
Chapter 8. Corollary Thematics I: Language
8.1. The Antecedency Status of Language
8.2. The Explication of Language as a Phenomenologically Speculative Task: Internal and External Treatment
8.2.1. Language and the ‘‘Ontological Experience’’
8.3. Ideality
8.4. Language as Transcendentally Ambivalent, That Is, Meontically Paradoxical
Chapter 9. Corollary Thematics II: Solitude and Community — Intersubjectivity
9.1. Lessons in ‘‘Meditation V’’ for Beginning Again
9.1.1. ‘‘Meditation V,’’ a First-Stage Analytic
9.1.2. Limitations to Egological Meditation
9.1.3. Protomodal Limitations in Empathy
9.1.4. Modifications of Protomodality
9.1.5. Complementary Indications on Openings beyond the Protomodal
9.2. Complements from the Broader Critique Context
9.2.1. The General Horizontal Grounding for the ‘‘Empathetic’’ Manifestness of Intersubjectivity
9.2.2. Two Prime Features in the Grounding of Intersubjectivity
9.2.2.1. In-Stanciality, the Meontic Reading
9.2.2.2. The Performance-Awareness of Being With an Experiencing Other in the In-Stance of Plural Humanity
9.2.2.3. The Materiality of Performance-Consciousness
9.3. Phenomenological Monadology
9.3.1. Transcendental Reflective Thematization and Monadic Egoity
9.3.2. The Transcendental Sense of Intersubjective Monadic Plurality
9.3.3. History and the Transcendental ‘‘Community’’
9.4. The Transcendental Sense of Human Solitude
Chapter 10. Beginning Again after the End of the Freiburg Phenomenology Workshop, 1938–1946
10.1. Return to the University in Germany
10.2. Continuation: Renewing the Phenomenological Tradition of Edmund Husserl
10.3. Critique and Continuation, with a Shift in Dimensional Emphasis