thinking

Denken  

Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the human being. It does not   make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to being solely as something handed over to thought itself from being. Such offering consists in the fact that in THINKING being comes to language. Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their saying. Thinking does not become action only because some effect ; issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest because it concerns the relation of being to humans. But all working or effecting lies in being and is directed toward beings. Thinking, in contrast, lets itself be claimed by being so that it can say the truth of being. Thinking accomplishes this letting. Thinking is l’engagement par l’Être pour l’Être [engagement by being for being]. I do not know whether it is linguistically possible to say both of these (“par” and “pour”) at once in this way: penser, c’est l’engagement de l’Etre [THINKING is the engagement of being]. Here the possessive form “de” is supposed to express both subjective and objective genitive In this regard “subject” and “object” are inappropriate terms of metaphysics, which very early on in [146] the form of Occidental “logic” and “grammar” seized control of the interpretation   of language. We today can only begin to descry what is concealed in that occurrence. The liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential framework is reserved for thought and poetic creation. Thinking is not merely l’engagement dans I’action for and by beings, in the sense of whatever is actually present in our current situation  . Thinking is l’engagement by and for the truth of being. The history of being is never past but stands ever before us; it sustains and defines every condition et situation humaine. In order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of THINKING purely, and that means at the same time to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of THINKING. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato   and Aristotle  . They take THINKING itself to be a τέχνη  , a process of deliberation in service to doing and making. But here deliberation is already seen from the perspective of πράξις and χοίησις. For this reason THINKING, when taken for itself, is not “practical.” The characterization of THINKING as θεωρία   and the determination of knowing as “theoretical” comportment occur already within the “technical” interpretation of THINKING. Such characterization is a reactive attempt to rescue THINKING and preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing. Since then “philosophy” has been in the constant predicament of having to justify its existence before the “sciences.” It believes it can do that most effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a science. But such an effort is the abandonment of the essence of THINKING. Philosophy is hounded by the fear that it loses prestige and validity if it is not a science. Not to be a science is taken as a foiling that is equivalent to being unscientific. Being,1 as the element of THINKING, is abandoned by the technical interpretation of THINKING. “Logic,” beginning with the Sophists and Plato, sanctions this explanation. [147] Thinking is judged by a standard that does not measure up to it. Such judgment may be compared to the procedure of trying to evaluate the essence and powers of a fish by seeing how long it can live on dry land. For a long time now, all too long, THINKING has been stranded on dry land. Can then the effort to return THINKING to its element be called “irrationalism”? (McNeill  , GA9  :313-314; CartaH)