Tag: GH
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Ahora bien, la última y peor de las confusiones consistiría en querer explicar la frase sobre la esencia exsistente del hombre como si fuera la aplicación secularizada y trasladada al hombre de una idea sobre dios expresada por la teología cristiana (Deus est ipsum esse); en efecto, la ex-sistencia no es la realización de una…
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Jeweiligkeit, precursor to Jemeingkeit = “mineness,” thus more like “whileness,” “temporal particularity”; je = “in each particular case” is typically translated as “always” in its high-frequency usage in the text, thus effacing its distributive and individuating intent, as in jeweils = “on each occasion, at each particular time,” jeweilig = “at this particular time, regarding…
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Igualmente por ello observaría Husserl, magnánimo, pero en el fondo reprobando el asunto, cómo yo, además de mis cursos y clases prácticas, estudiaba semanalmente en grupos de seminario y con alumnos más avanzados las Investigaciones lógicas. La preparación de ese seminario resultaría fructífera sobre todo para mí. Allí es donde me percataría – llevado primero…
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Condition of possibility, (Bedingung der Möglichkeit), 11 (a priori), 13 (ontic-ontological), 19, 37 (through hermeneutics), 38, 53 (mineness as), 75 (unthematized world as), 83 (reference as), 85 (relevance as), 87-88, 103, 125, 145 (possibility), 193, 199 (care as), 204 (Kant on), 223 (project as), 226 (primordial truth as), 260, 263, 267, 280, 286 (being-guilty as),…
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Wiederholung Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present (gegenwärtigendes Geswärtigen) – an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding “having been”. The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it…
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das Worumwillen (SZ:84) When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its “involvement”. With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about…
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But quite apart from the specific problem of the world itself, can the Being of what we encounter proximally within-the-world be reached ontologically by this procedure? When we speak of material Thinghood, have we not tacitly posited a kind of Being – the constant PRESENCE-AT-HAND of Things – which is so far from having been…