The Greek expression phainomenon, to which the term ‘phenomenon’ goes back, is derived from the verb phainesthai, which signifies “to show itself “. Thus phainomenon means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. phainesthai itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from phaino – to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. phaino comes from the stem pha – , like phos, the light, that which is bright – in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the phainomena or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with ta onta (entities). Now an entity can show itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it ‘looks like something or other’ [“sieht” … “so aus wie …”]. This kind of SHOWING-ITSELF is what we call “seeming” [Scheinen]. Thus in Greek too the expression phainomenon (“phenomenon”) signifies that which looks like something, that which is ‘semblant’, ‘semblance’ [das “Scheinbare”, der “Schein”]. phainomenon agathon means something good which looks like, but ‘in actuality’ is not, what it gives itself out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of phainomenon (‘phenomenon’ as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (‘phenomenon’ as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a phenomenon – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it ‘merely look like so-and-so’. When phainomenon signifies ‘semblance’, the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term ‘phenomenon’ to this positive and primordial signification of phainomenon, and distinguish “phenomenon” from “semblance”, which is the privative modification of “phenomenon” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what iscalled an ‘appearance’, or still less a ‘mere appearance’. BTMR §7
In spite of the fact that ‘appearing’ is never a SHOWING-ITSELF in the sense of “phenomenon”, appearing is possible only by reason of a SHOWING-ITSELF of something. But this SHOWING-ITSELF, which helps to make possible the appearing, is not the appearing itself. Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself. If one then says that with the word ‘appearance’ we allude to something wherein something appears without being itself an appearance, one has not thereby defined the concept of phenomenon: one has rather presupposed it. This presupposition, however, remains concealed; for when one says this sort of thing about ‘appearance’, the expression ‘appear’ gets used in two ways. “That wherein something ‘appears’” means that wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself; and in the words [Rede] ‘without being itself an “appearance”’, “appearance” signifies the SHOWING-ITSELF. But this SHOWING-ITSELF belongs essentially to the ‘wherein’ in which something announces itself. According to this, phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena. If one defines “phenomenon” with the aid of a conception of ‘appearance’ which is still unclear, then everything is stood on its head, and a ‘critique’ of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking. [SZ:30] BTMR §7
So again the expression ‘appearance’ itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as not-showingitself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst] – that which in its SHOWING-ITSELF indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use “appearing” as a term for the genuine sense of “phenomenon” as SHOWING-ITSELF. If one designates these three different things as ‘appearance’, bewilderment is unavoidable. BTMR §7
But this bewilderment is essentially increased by the fact that ‘appearance’ can take on still another signification. That which does the announcing-that which, in its SHOWING-ITSELF, indicates something non-manifest – may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the nonmanifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest. When that which does the announcing is taken this way, “appearance” is tantamount to a “bringing forth” or “something brought forth”, but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth: here we have an appearance in the sense of ‘mere appearance’. That which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself. On the other hand, this notshowing which veils is not a semblance. Kant uses the term “appearance” in this twofold way. According to him “appearances” are, in the first place, the ‘objects of empirical intuition’: they are what shows itself in such intuition. But what thus shows itself (the “phenomenon” in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an ‘appearance’ as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance – an emanation which announces. BTMR §7
Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of “phenomenon” what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And this SHOWING-ITSELF is not just any SHOWING-ITSELF, nor is it some such thing as appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that ‘behind it’ stands something else ‘which does not appear’. [SZ:36] BTMR §7
[SZ:29] This is what one is talking about when one speaks of the ‘symptoms of a disease’ [“Krankheitserscheinungen”]. Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves a s thus showing themselves, ‘indicate’ [“indizieren”] something which does not show itself. The emergence [Auftreten] of such occurrences, their SHOWING-THEMSELVES, goes together with the Being-present-at-hand of disturbances which do not show themselves. Thus appearance, as the appearance ‘of something’, does not mean SHOWING-ITSELF; it means rather the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself. But the ‘not’ we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative “not” which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves. BTMR §7“Phenomenon”, the SHOWING-ITSELF-IN-ITSELF, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. “Appearance”, on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a ‘phenomenon’. Both appearance and semblance are founded upon the phenomenon, though in different ways. The bewildering multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the words “phenomenon”, “semblance”, “appearance”, “mere appearance”, cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself. BTMR §7
[SZ:29] This is what one is talking about when one speaks of the ‘symptoms of a disease’ [“Krankheitserscheinungen”]. Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves a s thus showing themselves, ‘indicate’ [“indizieren”] something which does not show itself. The emergence [Auftreten] of such occurrences, their SHOWING-THEMSELVES, goes together with the Being-present-at-hand of disturbances which do not show themselves. Thus appearance, as the appearance ‘of something’, does not mean showingitself; it means rather the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself. But the ‘not’ we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative “not” which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves. BTMR §7