Sheehan (2015:85) – phainomenon – being

In Heidegger’s telling, the Greeks were the first to fundamentally experience being (to on) as phainomenon, that which of itself shows itself, that which appears. Professor John H. Finley, Jr., in his informative Four Stages of Greek Thought¹ confirms from a classicist’s point of view what Heidegger finds operative in Greek thought from Homer to Aristotle, namely, that the presence of beings in the world is (88) experienced as their appearing, where phainesthai means that a being brings itself to radiant self-manifestation (sich zum Scheinen, bringen) and “is” precisely insofar as it shows itself in that self-manifestation.²

In appearing, a being appears as something meaningful in the broadest sense: as a shield that the warrior can use or as the ship he can launch or as the god he can reverence or challenge. This “as”-character bespeaks the arrival of meaning amongst beings, the “irruption” that occurs only with the arrival of man. Indeed, men can deal with beings only insofar as they appear as such and so, and the philosopher is distinguished by the fact that he asks the question of their “appearing-as” as such. He asks the question of their “Being.”

What we have said so far indicates two things. In the first place: Whenever the Greeks speak of beings (to on), they always imply beings as something or other (to on hei . . .), that is, in terms of some modality of meaningful presence, even if the “as” (hei) is not expressly stated. This “as”-dimension of beings, which is spoken forth in the “is” of apophantic discourse, articulates the Being-dimension of beings. Hence, to on always means “a-being-in-a-modality-of-Being,” and Heidegger can correctly translate to on as das seiend-Sein.³ To express this unity, Aristotle often uses ousia, a noun which, derived through the participle ousa from einai, can adequately be translated by the neologism “is-ness” or “Beingness” (Seiendheit) .⁴ Therefore, the question that defines first philosophy, “What is to on?”, must be fleshed out to say, “What is to on hei on?” — “What is a being (any being, all beings) precisely as a being, that is, in its Beingness?” The question clearily focuses on the “as”-dimension of beings. It does not seek an ontic answer, but an ontological one insofar as it directs itself to the “as-ness” or “is-ness” as such. Therefore Aristotle spells out the above question more clearly when he says (Meta., Z, 1, 1028 b 2ff.) that the question, “What is a being as a being?” comes down to the question, “What is is-ness?” (tis he ousia;). And this question seeks not the is-ness of any delimited region of beings, but of all beings in terms of the analogical unity governing all possible modes of is-ness.⁵ Aristotle’s question about ousia is his formulation of the question of the meaning of Being.

A second thing needs to be said. To speak of beings as phainomena is at least to imply the locus of their meaningful appearance, the horizon wherein that meaningfulness is articulated. Beings as phainomena are correlative to modes of “awareness” (Vernehmen) in the broadest sense, that is, to a legein or noein that is revelatory of the phainomenon as what and how it is. Without logos, no is-ness.⁶ The uniqueness of man as “the living being who has logos” (zoon logon echon) consists in the fact that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of some modality of their “appearance-as . . .” in logos. Aristotle thematizes the function of logos as deloun (to make visible), apophainesthai (to show forth), and most importantly as aletheuein (to uncover or bring out of hiddenness).⁷ For man, to on is always on legomenon, “read” beings, beings articulated according to the multiplicity of modes of meaningful presence that are expressed in the implicit “as” or the explicit “is” of apophantic discourse.

We may summarize these two points: A being always implies a Being-dimension that is expressed in the “as”, and the only locus of this Being-dimension is man’s essence as logos or aletheuein. To on and legein are “apriori correlative”; man’s very nature is “phenomenological” (legein ta phainomena). And if one attempts the task proper to first philosophy, namely, legein to on hei on, then the resultant ontology must be phenomenological. Indeed, only as phenomenology is ontology possible.

1. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Cf. pp. 3, 5, 27, 29, 53f.[↩]
2. US 132 (38). Cf. EM 46 (50), 54 (59); WEG 345f.[↩]
3. WP 31 (97) ; cf, EM 24 (25f.).[↩]
4. WEG 329f.[↩]
5. Meta., G, 1, 1003 a 21.[↩]
6. Cf. SZ 212 (255): “Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heisst die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, ‘gibt es’ Sein.”[↩]
7. SZ 32f. (56f.) and footnote thereto.[↩]