scheinen: parecer, brilhar, aparecer, (a)parecer
Anschein (r): aspecto, o aparentar
erscheinen / Erscheinung (e): aparecer / aparência, aparição, fenômeno
Schein (r): brilho, aparência, brilho da aparência (C)
Zum-Vorschein-Kommen (s): o vir ao de cima (GA5BD)

The vocabulary of phenomenality is distributed in German over several linguistic registers: alongside terms of Germanic origin based on the verb scheinen ( to shine, to appear, to seem ) and on the adjective offenbar ( manifest, clear, obvious )—terms such as Erscheinung ( phenomenon, appearance ) and Offenbarung ( revelation )—we find terms from foreign languages that constitute the technical vocabulary of modern philosophy, such as Phänomen, borrowed from the Greek, or Manifestation, taken from Latin.

It is Kant who, with his rigid distinction between Erscheinung and Phänomen on one hand and Schein on the other, gives “phenomenon” its modern definition, whereas Lambert, who was probably the first to use the term “phenomenology,” continues to operate under the traditional distinction between truth and appearance. In Hegel, the vocabulary of manifestation appears alongside the Kantian distinction between Schein and Erscheinung, which he renews; and Schelling, following Fichte, gives the concept of Offenbarung ( revelation ) its fullest range. However, it is in the framework of phenomenology that the concepts of Phänomen, Erscheinung, and Schein, in a new distribution, will return to the center of philosophical debate with Husserl, who emphasizes their “equivocations” and Heidegger, who assigns himself the task in 1927 of providing a fundamental clarification of their meaning.

It is thus of the utmost importance for Heidegger not to place Schein and Erscheinung on the same level: the former, as a privative modification of Phänomen, includes the dimension of the manifest, while the latter, like all indications, representations, symptoms, and symbols, already presupposes in itself the dimension of the self-display of something, that is, the Phänomen: “In spite of the fact that ‘appearing’ ( Erscheinen ) is never a showing-itself ( Sichzeigen ) in the sense of ‘phenomenon’ ( Phänomen ), appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something” ( Sein und Zeit, 53 ). (CassinDU) (CassinDU)