However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive PHENOMENON which needs to be clarified. An investigation of the meaning of Being cannot be expected to give this clarification at the outset. If we are to obtain the clue we need for Interpreting this average understanding of Being, we must first develop the concept of Being. In the light of this concept and the ways in which it may be explicitly understood, we can make out what this obscured or still unillumined understanding of Being means, and what kinds of obscuration – or hindrance to an explicit illumination – of the meaning of Being are possible and even inevitable. [SZ:6] BTMR §2
In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the PHENOMENON of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. BTMR §5
In line with the positive tendencies of this destruction, we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the Interpretation of Being and the PHENOMENON of time have been brought together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and whether the problematic of Temporality required for this has ever been worked out in principle or ever could have been. The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant. Only when we have established the problematic of Temporality, can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show us why this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real dimensions and its central ontological function. Kant himself was aware that he was venturing into an area of obscurity: ‘This schematism of our understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, the true devices of which are hardly ever to be divined from Nature and laid uncovered before our eyes.’ Here Kant shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something which must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression “Being” is to have any demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading of ‘Temporality’, in our analysis, are precisely those most covert judgments of the ‘common reason’ for which Kant says it is the ‘business of philosophers’ to provide an analytic. BTMR §6
In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic of Temporality as our clue, we shall try to Interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time, taking that chapter as our point of departure. At the same time we shall show why Kant could never achieve an insight into the problematic of Temporality. There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject. Instead of this, Kant took over Descartes’ position quite dogmatically, notwithstanding all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that he was bringing the PHENOMENON of time back into the subject again, his analysis of it remained oriented towards the traditional way in which time had been ordinarily understood; in the long run this kept him from working out the PHENOMENON of a ‘transcendental determination of time’ in its own structure and function. Because of this double effect of tradition the decisive connection ‘between time and the ‘I think’ was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem. [SZ:24] BTMR §6
Aristotle’s essay on time is the first detailed Interpretation of this PHENOMENON which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has been essentially determined by it. When we analyse the Aristotelian conception, it will likewise become clear, as we go back, that the Kantian account of time operates within the structures which Aristotle has set forth; this means that Kant’s basic ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks, in spite of all the distinctions which arise in a new inquiry. BTMR §6
This expression has two components: “PHENOMENON” and “logos”. Both of these go back to terms from the Greek: phainomenon and logos. Taken superficially, the term “phenomenology” is formed like “theology”, “biology”, “sociology” – names which may be translated as “science of God”, “science of life”, “science of society”. This would make phenomenology the science of phenomena. We shall set forth the preliminary conception of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the term’s two components, ‘PHENOMENON’ and ‘logos’, and by establishing the meaning of the name in which these are put together. The history of the word itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian school, is here of no significance. BTMR §7
The Greek expression phainomenon, to which the term ‘PHENOMENON’ goes back, is derived from the verb phainesthai, which signifies “to show itself “. Thus phainomenon means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. phainesthai itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from phaino – to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. phaino comes from the stem pha – , like phos, the light, that which is bright – in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘PHENOMENON’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the phainomena or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with ta onta (entities). Now an entity can show itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it ‘looks like something or other’ [“sieht” … “so aus wie …”]. This kind of showing-itself is what we call “seeming” [Scheinen]. Thus in Greek too the expression phainomenon (“PHENOMENON”) signifies that which looks like something, that which is ‘semblant’, ‘semblance’ [das “Scheinbare”, der “Schein”]. phainomenon agathon means something good which looks like, but ‘in actuality’ is not, what it gives itself out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of PHENOMENON, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of phainomenon (‘PHENOMENON’ as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (‘PHENOMENON’ as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a PHENOMENON – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it ‘merely look like so-and-so’. When phainomenon signifies ‘semblance’, the primordial signification (the PHENOMENON as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term ‘PHENOMENON’ to this positive and primordial signification of phainomenon, and distinguish “PHENOMENON” from “semblance”, which is the privative modification of “PHENOMENON” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what iscalled an ‘appearance’, or still less a ‘mere appearance’. BTMR §7
In spite of the fact that ‘appearing’ is never a showing-itself in the sense of “PHENOMENON”, appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something. But this showing-itself, which helps to make possible the appearing, is not the appearing itself. Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself. If one then says that with the word ‘appearance’ we allude to something wherein something appears without being itself an appearance, one has not thereby defined the concept of PHENOMENON: one has rather presupposed it. This presupposition, however, remains concealed; for when one says this sort of thing about ‘appearance’, the expression ‘appear’ gets used in two ways. “That wherein something ‘appears’” means that wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself; and in the words [Rede] ‘without being itself an “appearance”’, “appearance” signifies the showing-itself. But this showing-itself belongs essentially to the ‘wherein’ in which something announces itself. According to this, phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena. If one defines “PHENOMENON” with the aid of a conception of ‘appearance’ which is still unclear, then everything is stood on its head, and a ‘critique’ of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking. [SZ:30] BTMR §7
So again the expression ‘appearance’ itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as not-showingitself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst] – that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use “appearing” as a term for the genuine sense of “PHENOMENON” as showing-itself. If one designates these three different things as ‘appearance’, bewilderment is unavoidable. BTMR §7
But this bewilderment is essentially increased by the fact that ‘appearance’ can take on still another signification. That which does the announcing-that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest – may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the nonmanifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest. When that which does the announcing is taken this way, “appearance” is tantamount to a “bringing forth” or “something brought forth”, but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth: here we have an appearance in the sense of ‘mere appearance’. That which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself. On the other hand, this notshowing which veils is not a semblance. Kant uses the term “appearance” in this twofold way. According to him “appearances” are, in the first place, the ‘objects of empirical intuition’: they are what shows itself in such intuition. But what thus shows itself (the “PHENOMENON” in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an ‘appearance’ as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance – an emanation which announces. BTMR §7
In so far as a PHENOMENON is constitutive for ‘appearance’ in the signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself, though such a PHENOMENON can privatively take the variant form of semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his checks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-presentat-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism. [SZ:31] BTMR §7
”PHENOMENON”, the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. “Appearance”, on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a ‘PHENOMENON’. Both appearance and semblance are founded upon the PHENOMENON, though in different ways. The bewildering multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the words “PHENOMENON”, “semblance”, “appearance”, “mere appearance”, cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the PHENOMENON is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself. BTMR §7
If in taking the concept of “PHENOMENON” this way, we leave indefinite which entities we consider as “phenomena”, and leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being, then we have merely arrived at the formal conception of “PHENOMENON”. If by “that which shows itself” we understand those entities which are accessible through the empirical “intuition” in, let us say, Kant’s sense, then the formal conception of “PHENOMENON” will indeed be legitimately employed. In this usage “PHENOMENON” has the signification of the ordinary conception of PHENOMENON. But this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception. If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a “PHENOMENON”, with reservations as to other differences; for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the “PHENOMENON” as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the ‘forms of the intuition’) will be the “phenomena” of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way – they must be able to become phenomena – if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori “inside-which” of an ordering. BTMR §7
If, however, the phenomenological conception of PHENOMENON is to be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of PHENOMENON and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification. – But before setting up our preliminary conception of phenomenology, we must also define the signification of logos so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a ‘science of’ phenomena at all. BTMR §7
When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The ‘truth of judgments’, however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary PHENOMENON of truth, with more than one kind of foundation. Both realism and idealism have – with equal thoroughness – missed the meaning of the Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the [SZ:34] possibility of something like a ‘doctrine of ideas’ can be understood as philosophical knowledge. BTMR §7
When we envisage concretely what we have set forth in our Interpretation’ of ‘PHENOMENON’ and ‘logos’, we are struck by an inner relationship between the things meant by these terms. The expression “phenomenology” may be formulated in Greek as legein ta phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai. Thus “phenomenology” means apophainesthai ta phainomena – to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself “phenomenology”. But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: ‘To the things themselves!’ BTMR §7
Thus the term “phenomenology” is quite different in its meaning from expressions such as “theology” and the like. Those terms designate the objects of their respective sciences according to the subject-matter which they comprise at the time [in ihrer jeweiligen Sachhaltigkeit]. ‘Phenomenology’ neither designates the object of its researches, nor characterizes the subject-matter thus comprised. The word merely informs us of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science ‘of’ phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. The expression ‘descriptive phenomenology’, which is at bottom tautological, has the same meaning. Here “description” does not signify such a procedure as we find, let us say, in botanical morphology; the term has rather the sense of a prohibition – the avoidance of characterizing anything without such demonstration.” The character of this description itself, the specific meaning of the logos, can be established first of all in terms of the ‘thinghood’ [“Sachheit”] of what is to be ‘described’ – that is to say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it phenomenally. The signification of “PHENOMENON”, as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called “phenomenology” with formal justification. [SZ:35] BTMR §7
Now what must be taken into account if the formal conception of PHENOMENON is to be deformalized into the phenomenological one, and how is this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception? What is it that phenomenology is to ‘let us see’? What is it that must be called a ‘PHENOMENON’ in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. BTMR §7
Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only ‘in disguise’, is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. Thus that which demands that ‘it become a PHENOMENON, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object. BTMR §7
Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of “PHENOMENON” what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And this showing-itself is not just any showing-itself, nor is it some such thing as appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that ‘behind it’ stands something else ‘which does not appear’. [SZ:36] BTMR §7
‘Behind’ the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else; on the other hand, what is to become a PHENOMENON can be hidden. And just because the phenomena are proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology. Covered-up-ness is the counterconcept to ‘PHENOMENON’. BTMR §7
There are various ways in which phenomena can be covered up. In the first place, a PHENOMENON can be covered up in the sense that it is still quite undiscovered. It is neither known nor unknown. Moreover, a PHENOMENON can be buried over [verschüttet]. This means that it has at some time been discovered but has deteriorated [verfiel] to the point of getting covered up again. This covering-up can become complete; or rather – and as a rule – what has been discovered earlier may still be visible, though only as a semblance. Yet so much semblance, so much ‘Being’. This covering-up as a ‘disguising’ is both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading arc especially stubborn. Within a ‘system’, perhaps, those structures of Being – and their concepts – which are still available but veiled in their indigenous character, may claim their rights. For when they have been bound together constructively in a system, they present themselves as something ‘clear’, requiring no further justification, and thus can serve as the point of departure for a process of deduction. BTMR §7
The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of PHENOMENON is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology. Thus the very point of departure [Ausgang] for our analysis requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much as does our access [Zugang] to the PHENOMENON, or our passage [Durchgang] through whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is ‘original’ and ‘intuitive’ [“originären” und “intuitiven”] is directly opposed to the na naïveté of a haphazard, ‘immediate’, and unreflective ‘beholding. [“Schauen”]. [SZ:37] BTMR §7
Now that we have delimited our preliminary conception of phenomenology, the terms ‘phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenological’ can also be fixed in their signification. That which is given and explicable in the way the PHENOMENON is encountered is called ‘phenomenal’; this is what we have in mind when we talk about “phenomenal structures”. Everything which belongs to the species of exhibiting and explicating and which goes to make up the way of conceiving demanded by this research, is called. ‘phenomenological’. BTMR §7
Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of ‘some entity, we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare; and we must do this in the right way. These entities must likewise show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them. And in this way the ordinary conception of PHENOMENON becomes phenomenologically relevant. If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the prior task of assuring ourselves ‘phenomenologically’ of that entity which is to serve as our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure. BTMR §7
The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary PHENOMENON. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. But while Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure. Indeed the phenomenal datum which our expression indicates is one which may, in fact, be looked at in three ways. If we study it, keeping the whole PHENOMENON firmly in mind beforehand, the following items may be brought out for emphasis: BTMR §12
Third, Being-in [In-sein] as such. We must set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood [Inheit] itself. (See the fifth chapter of this Division.) Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized along with it; this means that in any such case the whole PHENOMENON gets seen. Of course Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein’s Being. Before making these three phenomena the themes for special analyses, we shall attempt by way of orientation to characterize the third of these factors. BTMR §12
But have we not confined ourselves to negative assertions in all our attempts to determine the nature of this state of Being? Though this Being-in is supposedly so fundamental, we always keep hearing about what it is not. Yes indeed. But there is nothing accidental about our characterizing it predominantly in so negative a manner. In doing so we have rather made known what is peculiar to this PHENOMENON, and our characterization is therefore positive in a genuine sense – a sense appropriate to the PHENOMENON itself. When Being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and concealments are rejected because this PHENOMENON itself always gets ‘seen’ in a certain way in every Dasein. And it thus gets ‘seen’ because it makes up a basic state of Dasein, and in every case is already disclosed for Dasein’s understanding of Being, and disclosed along with that Being itself. But for the most part this PHENOMENON has been explained in a way which is basically wrong, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate manner. On the other hand, this ‘seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining’ is itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein’s Being, which is such that Dasein itself – and this means also its Being-in-the-world – gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters ‘within’ its world, and from the Being which they possess. BTMR §12
Thus the PHENOMENON of Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar – knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is ‘non-theoretical’ and ‘atheoretical’. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its ownmost kind of Being gets led astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential ‘modality’ of Being-in. BTMR §12
If Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein, and one in which Dasein operates not only in general but pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness, then it must also be something which has always been experienced ontically. It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view, especially since Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its own Being, no matter how indefinitely this understanding may function. But no sooner was the ‘PHENOMENON of knowing the world’ grasped than it got interpreted in a ‘superficial’, [SZ:60] formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of setting up knowing as a ‘relation between subject and Object’ – a procedure in which there lurks as much ‘truth’ as vacuity. But subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world. BTMR §13
With this kind of approach one remains blind to what is already tacitly implied even when one takes the PHENOMENON of knowing as one’s theme in the most provisional manner: namely, that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being. But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already ‘alongside’ its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject? In this question the constructivist ‘standpoint’, which has not been phenomenally demonstrated, again comes to the fore; but quite apart from this, what higher court is to decide whether and in what sense there is to be any problem of knowledge other than that of the PHENOMENON of knowing as such and the kind of Being which belongs to the knower? BTMR §13
Being-in-the-world shall first be made visible with regard to that item of its structure which is the ‘world’ itself. To accomplish this task seems easy and so trivial as to make one keep taking for granted that it may be dispensed with. What can be meant by describing ‘the world’ as a PHENOMENON? It means to let us see what shows itself in ‘entities’ within the world. Here the first step is to enumerate the things that are ‘in’ the world: houses, trees, people, mountains, stars. We can depict the way such entities ‘look’, and we can give an account of occurrences in them and with them. This, however, is obviously a pre-phenomenological ‘business’ which cannot be at all relevant phenomenologically. Such a description is always confined to entities. It is ontical. But what we are seeking is Being. And we have formally defined ‘PHENOMENON’ in the phenomenological sense as that which shows itself as Being and as a structure of Being. BTMR §14
But is this a way of asking ontologically about the ‘world’? The problematic which we have thus marked out is one which is undoubtedly ontological. But even if this ontology should itself succeed in explicating the Being of Nature in the very purest manner, in conformity with the basic assertions about this entity, which the mathematical natural sciences provide, it will never reach the PHENOMENON that is the ‘world’. Nature is itself an entity which is encountered within the world and which can be discovered in various ways and at various stages. BTMR §14
Neither the ontical depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the PHENOMENON of the ‘world.’ In both of these ways of access to ‘Objective Being’, the ‘world’ has already been ‘presupposed’, and indeed in various ways. BTMR §14
Is it possible that ultimately we cannot address ourselves to ‘the world’ as determining the nature of the entity we have mentioned? Yet we call this entity one which is “within-the-world”. Is ‘world’ perhaps a characteristic of Dasein’s Being? And in that case, does every Dasein ‘proximally’ have its world? Does not ‘world’ thus become something ‘subjective? How, then, can there be a ‘common’ world ‘in’ which, nevertheless, we are? And if we raise the question of the ‘world’, what world do we have in view? Neither the common world nor the subjective world, but the worldhood of the world as such. By what avenue do we meet this PHENOMENON? BTMR §14
‘Worldhood’ is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world. But we know Being-in-the-world as a way in which Dasein’s character is defined existentially. Thus worldhood itself is an existentiale. If we inquire ontologically about the ‘world’, we by no means abandon the analytic of Dasein as a field for thematic study. Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself. This does not rule out the possibility that when we investigate the PHENOMENON of the ‘world’ we must do so by the avenue of entities within-the-world and the Being which they possess. The task of ‘describing’ the world phenomenologically is so far from obvious that even if we do no more than determine adequately what form it shall take, essential ontological clarifications will be needed. BTMR §14
A glance at previous ontology shows that if one fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, the PHENOMENON of worldhood likewise gets passed over. One tries instead to Interpret the world in terms of the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand within-the-world but which are by no means proximally discovered – namely, in terms of Nature. If one understands Nature ontologico-categorially, one finds that Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible entities within-the-world. Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature. This manner of knowing them has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way. ‘Nature’, as the categorial aggregate of those structures of Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never make worldhood intelligible. But even the PHENOMENON of ‘Nature’, as it is conceived, for instance, in romanticism, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the concept of the world – that is to say, in terms of the analytic of Dasein. BTMR §14
When it comes to the problem of analysing the world’s worldhood ontologically, traditional ontology operates in a blind alley, if, indeed, it sees this problem at all. On the other hand, if we are to Interpret the worldhood of Dasein and the possible ways in which Dasein is made worldly [Verweltlichung], we must show why the kind of Being with which Dasein knows the world is such that it passes over the PHENOMENON of worldhood both ontically and ontologically. But at the same time the very Fact of this passing-over suggests that we must take special precautions to get the right phenomenal point of departure [Ausgang] for access [Zugang] to the PHENOMENON of worldhood, so that it will not get passed over. [SZ:66] BTMR §14
In the disclosure and explication of Being, entities are in every case our preliminary and our accompanying theme [das Vor-und Mitthematische]; but our real theme is Being. In the domain of the present analysis, the entities we shall take as our preliminary theme are those which show themselves in our concern with the environment. Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the ‘world’ theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth. As entities so encountered, they become the preliminary theme for the purview of a ‘knowing’ which, as phenomenological, looks primarily towards Being, and which, in thus taking Being as its theme, takes these entities as its accompanying theme. This phenomenological interpretation is accordingly not a way of knowing those characteristics of entities which themselves are [seiender Beschaffenheiten des Seienden]; it is rather a determination of the structure of the Being which entities possess. But as an investigation of Being, it brings to completion, autonomously and explicitly, that understanding of Being which belongs already to Dasein and which ‘comes alive’ in any of its dealings with entities. Those entities which serve phenomenologically as our preliminary theme – in this case, those which are used or which are to be found in the course of production – become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves with them in some such way. Taken strictly, this talk about “putting ourselves into such a position” [Sichversetzen] is misleading; for the kind of Being which belongs to such concernful dealings is not one into which we need to put ourselves first. This is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch. The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us, and which conceal not only the PHENOMENON of such ‘concern’, but even more those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord in our concern with them. These entangling errors become plain if in the course of our investigation we now ask which entities shall be taken as our preliminary theme and established as the pre-phenomenal basis for our study. BTMR §15
In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something. Only in the analyses which are to follow can the PHENOMENON which this term ‘assignment’ indicates be made visible in its ontological genesis. Provisionally, it is enough to take a look phenomenally at a manifold of such assignments. Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the ‘arrangement’ emerges, and it is in this that any ‘individual’ item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered. [SZ:69] BTMR §15
But even if, as our ontological Interpretation proceeds further, readiness-to-hand should prove itself to be the kind of Being characteristic of those entities which are proximally discovered within-the-world, and even if its primordiality as compared with pure presence-at-hand can be demonstrated, have all these explications been of the slightest help towards understanding the PHENOMENON of the world ontologically? In Interpreting these entities within-the-world, however, we have always [SZ:72] BTMR §15
‘presupposed’ the world. Even if we join them together, we still do not get anything like the ‘world’ as their sum. If, then, we start with the Being of these entities, is there any avenue that will lead us to exhibiting the PHENOMENON of the world? BTMR §15
The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as ‘there is’ a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their Being, as entities which have been discovered. But in what way ‘is there’ a world? If Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-World, and if an understanding of the Being of its Self belongs just as essentially to its Being, no matter how indefinite that understanding may be, then does not Dasein have an understanding of the world – a pre-ontological understanding, which indeed can and does get along without explicit ontological insights? With those entities which are encountered within-the-world – that is to say, with their character as within-the-world – does not something like the world show itself for concernful Being-in-the-world? Do we not have a pre-phenomenological glimpse of this PHENOMENON? Do we not always have such a glimpse of it, without having to take it as a theme for ontological Interpretation? Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absorption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, along with those entities themselves? BTMR §16
If such possibilities of Being for Dasein can be exhibited within its concernful dealings, then the way lies open for studying the PHENOMENON which is thus lit up, and for attempting to ‘hold it at bay’, as it were, and to interrogate it as to those structures which show themselves therein. BTMR §16
Now that we have suggested, however, that the ready-to-hand is thus encountered under modifications in which its presence-at-hand is revealed, how far does this clarify the PHENOMENON of the world? Even in analysing these modifications we have not gone beyond the Being of what is within-the-world, and we have come no closer to the world-phenomenon than before. But though we have not as yet grasped it, we have brought ourselves to a point where we can bring it into view. BTMR §16
In such privative expressions as “inconspicuousness”, “unobtrusiveness”, and “non-obstinacy”, what we have in view is a positive phenomenal character of the Being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. With these’ negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as “holding itself in”; this is what we have our eye upon in the “Being-in-itself” of something, though ‘proximally’ we ascribe it to the present-at-hand – to the present-at-hand as that which can be thematically ascertained. As long as we take our orientation primarily and exclusively from the present-at-hand, the ‘in-itself’ can by no means be ontologically clarified. If, however, this talk about the ‘in-itself’ has any ontological importance, some interpretation must be called for. This “in-itself” of Being is something which gets invoked with considerable emphasis, mostly in an ontical way, and rightly so from a phenomenal standpoint. But if some ontological assertion is supposed to be given when this is ontically invoked, its claims are not fulfilled by such a procedure. As the foregoing analysis has already made clear, only on the basis of the PHENOMENON of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically. [SZ:76] BTMR §16
These questions are aimed at working out both the PHENOMENON and the problems of worldhood, and they call for an inquiry into the interconnections with which certain structures are built up. To answer them we must analyse these structures more concretely. BTMR §16
In our provisional Interpretation of that structure of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand (to ‘equipment’), the PHENOMENON of reference or assignment became visible; but we merely gave an indication of it, and in so sketchy a form that we at once stressed the necessity of uncovering it with regard to its ontological origin. It became plain, moreover, that assignments and referential totalities could in some sense become constitutive for worldhood itself. Hitherto we have seen the world lit up only in and for certain definite ways in which we concern ourselves environmentally with the ready-to-hand, and indeed it has been lit up only with the readiness-to-hand of that concern. So the further we proceed in understanding the Being of entities within-the-world, the broader and firmer becomes the phenomenal basis on which the world-phenomenon may be laid bare. [SZ:77] BTMR §17
We shall again take as our point of departure the Being of the ready-to-hand, but this time with the purpose of grasping the PHENOMENON of reference or assignment itself more precisely. We shall accordingly attempt an ontological analysis of a kind of equipment in which one may come across such ‘references’ in more senses than one. We come across ‘equipment’ in signs. The word “sign” designates many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for ‘characterizing’ any entity whatsoever. BTMR §17
If the present analysis is to be confined to the interpretation of the sign as distinct from the PHENOMENON of reference, then even within this limitation we cannot properly investigate the full multiplicity of possible signs. Among signs there are symptoms [Anzeichen], warning signals, signs of things that have happened already [Rückzeichen], signs to mark something, signs by which things are recognized; these have different ways of indicating, regardless of what may be serving as such a sign. From such ‘signs’ we must distinguish traces, residues, commemorative monuments, documents, testimony, symbols, expressions, appearances, significations. These phenomena can easily be formalized because of their formal relational character; we find it especially tempting nowadays to take such a ‘relation’ as a clue for subjecting every entity to a kind of ‘Interpretation’ which always ‘fits’ because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content and form. [SZ:78] BTMR §17
One might be tempted to cite the abundant use of ‘signs’ in primitive Dasein, as in fetishism and magic, to illustrate the remarkable role which they play in everyday concern when it comes to our understanding of the world. Certainly the establishment of signs which underlies this way of using them is not performed with any theoretical aim or in the course of theoretical speculation. This way of using them always remains completely within a Being-in-the-world which is ‘immediate’. But on closer inspection it becomes plain that to interpret fetishism and magic by taking our clue from the idea of signs in general, is not enough to enable us to grasp the kind of ‘Being-ready-to-hand’ which belongs to entities encountered in the primitive world. With regard to the signphenomenon, the following Interpretation may be given: for primitive man, the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute for what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always is what it indicates. This remarkable coinciding does not mean, however, that the sign-Thing has already undergone a certain ‘Objectification’ – that it has been experienced as a mere Thing and misplaced into the same realm of Being of the present-at-hand as what it indicates. This ‘coinciding’ is not an identification of things which have hitherto been isolated from each other: it consists rather in the fact that the sign has not as yet become free from that of which it is a sign. Such a use of signs is still absorbed completely in Being-towards what is indicated, so that a sign as such cannot detach itself at all. This coinciding is based not on a prior Objectification but on the fact that such Objectification is completely lacking. This means, however, that signs are not discovered as equipment at all – that ultimately what is ‘ready-to-hand’ within-the-world just does not have the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. Perhaps even readiness-to-hand and equipment have nothing to contribute [nichts auszurichten] as ontological clues in Interpreting the primitive world; and certainly the ontology of Thinghood does even less. But if an understanding of Being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and for the primitive world in general, then it is all the more urgent to work out the ‘formal’ idea of worldhood – or at least the idea of a PHENOMENON modifiable in such a way that all ontological assertions to the effect that in a given phenomenal context something is not yet such-and-such or no longer such-and-such, may acquire a positive phenomenal meaning in terms of what it is not. BTMR §17
[SZ:84] When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its “involvement”. With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the “towards-which” of serviceability, and the “for-which” of usability. With the “towards-which” of serviceability there can again be an involvement: with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a “hammer”, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection ‘is’ for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein – that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being. Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, what involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements. In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there is no further involvement: this “towards-which” is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary “towards-which” is not just another “towards-this” as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary ‘towards-which’ is a “for-the-sake-of-which”. But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very Being as the sole authentic “for-the-sake-of-which”; for the present, however, we shall pursue this no further. ‘Letting something be involved’ must first be clarified enough to give the PHENOMENON of worldhood the kind of definiteness which makes it possible to formulate any problems about it. BTMR §18Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the “with-which” and the “in-which” of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the “towards-this” as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the “for-the-sake-of-which” to which every “towards-which” ultimately goes back – all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility [Verständlichkeit]. And what is that wherein Dasein as Being-in-the-world understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to” [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is – one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This “in-order-to” prescribes a “towards-this” as a possible “in-which” for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement which something has – an involvement which is with something. Dasein always assigns itself from a “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the PHENOMENON of the world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. BTMR §18
Only step by step can the concept of worldhood and the structures which this PHENOMENON embraces be firmly secured in the course of our investigation. The Interpretation of the world begins, in the first instance, with some entity within-the-world, so that the PHENOMENON of the world in general no longer comes into view; we shall accordingly try to clarify this approach ontologically by considering what is perhaps the most extreme form in which it has been carried out. We not only shall present briefly the basic features of Descartes’ ontology of the ‘world’, but shall inquire into its presuppositions and try to characterize these in the light of what we have hitherto achieved. The account we shall give of these matters will enable us to know upon what basically undiscussed ontological ‘foundations’ those Interpretations of the world which have come after Descartes – and still more those which preceded him – have operated. [SZ:89] BTMR §18
The critical question now arises: does this ontology of the ‘world’ seek the PHENOMENON of the world at all, and if not, does it at least define some entity within-the-world fully enough so that the worldly character of this entity can be made visible in it? To both questions we must answer “No”. The entity which Descartes is trying to grasp ontologically and in principle with his “extensio”, is rather such as to become discoverable first of all by going through an entity within-the-world which is proximally ready-to-hand – Nature. Though this is the case, and though any ontological characterization of this latter entity within-the-world may lead us into obscurity, even if we consider both the idea of substantiality and the meaning of the “existit” and “ad existendum” which have been brought into the definition of that idea, it still remains possible that through an ontology based upon a radical separation of God, the “I”, and the ‘world’, the ontological problem of the world will in some sense get formulated and further advanced. If, however, this is not possible, we must then demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes’ conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the PHENOMENON of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand. BTMR §21
In our exposition of the problem of worldhood (Section 14), we suggested the importance of obtaining proper access to this PHENOMENON. So in criticizing the Cartesian point of departure, we must ask which kind of Being that belongs to Dasein we should fix upon as giving us an appropriate way of access to those entities with whose Being as extensio Descartes equates the Being of the ‘world’. The only genuine access to them lies in knowing [ Erkennen), intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [ Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are. Accordingly, that which can be shown to have the character of something that constantly remains (as remanens capax mutationum), makes up the real Being of those entities of the world which get experienced. That which enduringly remains, really is. This is the sort of thing which mathematics knows. That which is accessible in an entity through mathematics, makes up its Being. Thus the Being of the ‘world’ is, as it were, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of Being which lies veiled in the concept of substantiality, [SZ:96] and in terms of the idea of a knowledge by which such entities are cognized. The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right – an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand. Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge. is exceptionally well suited to grasp. In this way Descartes explicitly switches over philosophically from the development of traditional ontology to modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations. BTMR §21
But with these criticisms, have we not fobbed off on Descartes a task altogether beyond his horizon, and then gone on to ‘demonstrate’ that he has failed to solve it? If Descartes does not know the PHENOMENON of the world, and thus knows no such thing as within-the-world-ness, how can he identify the world itself with certain entities within-the-world and the Being which they possess? BTMR §21
In controversy over principles, one must not only attach oneself to theses which can be grasped doxographically; one must also derive one’s orientation from the objective tendency of the problematic, even if it does not go beyond a rather ordinary way of taking things. In his doctrine of the res cogitans and the res extensa, Descartes not only wants to formulate the problem of ‘the “I” and the world’; he claims to have solved it in a radical manner. His Meditations make this plain. (See especially Meditations I and VI.) By taking his basic ontological orientation from traditional sources and not subjecting it to positive criticism, he has made it impossible to lay bare any primordial ontological problematic of Dasein; this has inevitably obstructed his view of the PHENOMENON of the world, and has made it possible for the ontology of the ‘world’ to be compressed into that of certain entities within-the-world. The foregoing discussion should have proved this. BTMR §21
But quite apart from the specific problem of the world itself, can the Being of what we encounter proximally within-the-world be reached ontologically by this procedure? When we speak of material Thinghood, have we not tacitly posited a kind of Being – the constant presence-at hand of Things – which is so far from having been rounded out ontologically by subsequently endowing entities with value-predicates, that these value-characters themselves are rather just ontical characteristics of those entities which have the kind of Being possessed by Things? Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. They would have their sole ultimate ontological source in our previously laying down the actuality of Things as the fundamental stratum. But even prephenomenological experience shows that in an entity which is supposedly a Thing, there is something that will not become fully intelligible through Thinghood alone. Thus the Being of Things has to be rounded out. What, then does the Being of values or their ‘validity’ [“Geltung”] (which Lotze took as a mode of ‘affirmation’) really amount to ontologically? And what does it signify ontologically for Things to be ‘invested’ with values in this way? As long as these matters remain obscure, to reconstruct the Thing of use in terms of the Thing of Nature is an ontologically questionable undertaking, even if one disregards the way in which the problematic has been perverted in principle. And if we are to reconstruct this Thing of use, which supposedly comes to us in the first instance ‘with its skin off’, does not this always require that we previously take a positive look at the PHENOMENON whose totality such a reconstruction is to restore? But if we have not given a proper explanation beforehand of its ownmost state of Being, are we not building our reconstruction without a plan? Inasmuch as this reconstruction and ‘rounding-out’ of the traditional ontology of the ‘world’ results in our reaching the same entities with which we started when we analysed the readiness-to-hand of equipment and the totality of [SZ:100] involvements, it seems as if the Being of these entities ‘has in fact been clarified or has at least become a problem. But by taking extensio as a proprietas, Descartes can hardly reach the Being of substance; and by taking refuge in ‘value’-characteristics (“wertlichen” Beschaffenheiten] we are just as far from even catching a glimpse of Being as readiness-to-hand, let alone permitting it to become an ontological theme.Descartes has narrowed down the question of the world to that of Things of Nature [Naturdinglichkeit] as those entities within-the-world’ which are proximally accessible. He has confirmed the opinion that to know an entity in what is supposedly the most rigorous ontical manner is our only possible access to the primary Being of the entity which such knowledge reveals. But at the same time we must have the insight to see that in principle the ‘roundings-out’ of the Thing-ontology also operate on the same dogmatic basis as that which Descartes has adopted.We have already intimated in Section 14 that passing over the world and those ‘entities which we proximally encounter is not accidental, not an oversight which it would be’ simple to correct, but that it is grounded in a kind of Being which belongs essentially to Dasein itself. When our analytic of Dasein has given some transparency to those main structures of Dasein which are of the most importance in the framework of this problematic, and when we have assigned [zugewiesen] to the concept of Being in general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible, so that readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand also become primordially intelligible ontologically for the first time, only then can our critique of the Cartesian ontology of the world (an ontology which, in principle, is still the usual one today) come philosophically into its own.To do this, we must show several things. (See Part One, Division Three.) BTMR §21
If space is constitutive for the world in a sense which we have yet to determine, then it cannot surprise us that in our foregoing ontological characterization of the Being of what is within-the-world we have had to look upon this as something that is also within space. This spatiality of the ready-to-hand is something which we have not yet grasped explicitly as a PHENOMENON; nor have we pointed out how it is bound up with the structure of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand. This is now our task. BTMR §22
One must notice, however, that the directionality which belongs to de-severance is founded upon Being-in-the-world. Left and right are not something ‘subjective’ for which the subject has a feeling; they are directions of one’s directedness into a world that is ready-to-hand already. ‘By the mere feeling of a difference between my two sides’ I could never find my way about in a world. The subject with a ‘mere feeling’ of this difference is a construct posited in disregard of the state that is truly constitutive for any subject – namely, that whenever Dasein has such a ‘mere feeling’, it is in a world already and must be in it to be able to orient itself at This becomes plain from the example with which Kant tries to clarify the PHENOMENON of orientation. BTMR §23
De-severance and directionality, as constitutive characteristics of Being-in, are determinative for Dasein’s spatiality – for its being concernfully and circumspectively in space, in a space discovered and within-the-world. Only the explication we have just given for the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world and the spatiality of Being-in-the-world, will. provide the prerequisites for working out the PHENOMENON of the world’s spatiality and formulating the ontological problem of space. BTMR §23
The space which is thus disclosed with the worldhood of the world still lacks the pure multiplicity of the three dimensions. In this disclosedness which is closest to us, space, as the pure “wherein” in which positions are ordered by measurement and the situations of things are determined, sti