πάθη (ή); v. pathos

GA2 184; SZ 138; GA9 268; GA18 121, 122, 126, 165, 167-70, 175-9, 181, 184, 185, 192, 194, 195, 197-200, 202-8, 226, 232, 239, 242, 246, 248, 250, 260, 262, 263, 323; GA19 126, 133, 335; GA20 393; GA21 167; GA22 153, 292; GA62 163, 164, 279; GA90 22, 123. (HC)

The pathe can be had; in having (Haben) there lies a relation to being. With the orientation of pathe toward hexis, the pathe are themselves oriented toward being-there as being (Dasein als Sein). This basic orientation, which is indicated in relation to hexis, is important for an understanding that is opposed to the traditional conception of the affects (Auffassung der Affekte), which is used to taking them as states “of the soul,” (seelische Zustände) and possibly in connection with “bodily symptoms.” One partitioned the phenomenon into bodily states and states of the soul (seelische und körperliche Zustände) – states that stand in some connection. On the other hand, it must be noted that Aristotle, in accordance with his orientation of treating the ensouled as the mode of being of living things (Weise des Seins des Lebenden), emphasizes that the pathe express the being of human beings (Sein des Menschen), so here there is from the beginning an entirely different basis. The originary unity of the phenomenon of the pathe lies in the being of human beings as such. (GA18:177; GA18MT:119-120)

The pathe, in an entirely general way, are characteristic of a disposition of human beings, a how of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, Aristotle provides, beforehand, a guide for the analysis that he carries through in Book 2 of the Rhetoric. He considers the affectus in three respects:

1. In relation to every pathos the question arises: pos diakeimenoi eisi: How do we find ourselves genuinely, of what sort is our being-in-the-world, when we are in a rage, when we are in fear, when we feel pity?

2. poia: About what do we get angry, lose composure?

3. epi poiois: In relation to whom, in encountering which sort of human beings, are we there in this way? In the basic structure of the pathe, we find, once again, the orientation to the being-with-one-another of being-there as being-in-the-world.

Presumably, it is the manifoldness of these relations, which are expressed through the pathe, which are then seized by hexis, and in relation to which hexis expresses a being-composed. In order to see the context of the pathe as possibilities of finding-oneself and possibilities of being-seized, we must look more closely at hexis itself, insofar as it is a basic determination of the being-there of human beings. (GA18:178-179; GA18MT:120-121)