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====== fenômeno (1983:23-27) ======

//Data: 2023-06-11 12:30//

==== Plato and Europe ====

=== 2. What is the Phenomenon? ===

//Fenômeno, então, nesse sentido, significa a mostração da existência, as coisas não apenas são, mas também são manifestas. Aparecimento / aparição naturalmente em certo sentido é, a seu modo, também uma coisa específica. Então é fácil colocar a questão de como esses dois se relacionam: coisa e aparição / aparecimento; ou a aparição existente e a coisa manifesta-em-si. Como eles se distinguem e como se sobrepõem, como se encontram?//

<tabbox tradução parcial do inglês>
O que significa fenômeno? Nós poderíamos começar com isto. A tradução padrão é "aparição / aparecimento". O que geralmente associamos à palavra aparecimento? Algo não só está aqui, mas também se mostra. Nem tudo também se mostra. Por um lado, as coisas são em si mesmas e são o que são; por outro lado, elas se mostram. Parece que isto se trata do problema do conhecimento, como se nossa consideração levasse em conta uma disciplina filosófica especializada, chamada teoria da cognição. Mas as coisas também se mostram mesmo onde o objetivo não é de cognição direta. Em toda parte, em relação à atividade humana, como estamos acostumados a defini-la como humana, em toda parte em que exatamente o humano é levado em consideração, diante de nós, temos não apenas coisas que são, mas também coisas que se mostram. Exatamente quando o homem quer conhecer, quando ao mesmo tempo quer agir, quando se orienta em relação ao bem e ao mal, em toda parte há algo – e isso é óbvio – que precisa se mostrar. Apenas aquilo que ele marca como bom e mau deve mostrar-se a ele. E, naturalmente, porque o bem e o mal são algo que nos diz respeito, ao mesmo tempo nos mostramos a nós mesmos. Fenômeno, então, nesse sentido, significa a mostração da existência, as coisas não apenas são, mas também são manifestas. Aparecimento / aparição naturalmente em certo sentido é, a seu modo, também uma coisa específica. Então é fácil colocar a questão de como esses dois se relacionam: coisa e aparição / aparecimento; ou a aparição existente e a coisa manifesta-em-si. Como eles se distinguem e como se sobrepõem, como se encontram?

Parece um problema secundário, algo de segunda ordem. Afinal, é óbvio que, se algo deve se manifestar, então, em primeiro lugar, deve haver aquilo que se manifesta. Manifestação só porque é a manifestação de algo existente e ela própria é, apesar de tudo, a ser especificada como algum tipo de característica, uma relação na manifestação existente ela mesma, ou eventualmente em algum tipo de outros existentes, que são necessários de modo que algo se manifeste. Pois certamente existem estruturas reais de existentes onde é óbvio pensar, imediatamente, quando pensamos a respeito dela, que algo se manifesta a si mesmo: um reflexo na água, no espelho. Uma imagem aparece no espelho. E sabemos bem que, por trás de algo como esta imagem, existe um certo processo físico, que existe um reflexo da luz e que o reflexo da luz tem certas estruturas que são reproduzidas, ou seja, certas características geométricas dos objetos são reproduzidas por características geométricas de formações ópticas que surgem do reflexo dos raios de luz. Afinal, isso é algo que já nos mostra como a imagem em um espelho apareceu. Exceto que a imagem apareceu no espelho. Certas coincidências estruturais ocorreram, mas essas coincidências estruturais não são mais ou menos fenômenos do que o próprio espelho e a luz que o reflete. Afinal, a coincidência da estrutura é um fato tão objetivo quanto o espelho, a luz e assim por diante. Cada um também é uma coisa também. Onde, então, temos algo como aparecendo, se manifestando?

Talvez a coisa seja diferente se dissermos que ainda é necessário adicionar algo. Para que algo se manifeste, é necessário que ele se manifeste, apareça para alguém. Algo como mente ou experiência é necessário. A mente é algo que está sempre ocupada – ou pelo menos em circunstâncias normais – com algo diferente de si mesmo. Também se ocupa consigo mesmo, mas acima de tudo se ocupa com outra coisa. Já é possível dizer aqui: para a mente, algo se mostra, algo diferente se mostra do que aquilo que é em si. No caso de objetos refletidos em um espelho, ainda temos apenas objetos materiais, e somente quando a mente vem e postula a coincidência entre o objeto de reflexão e o reflexo temos uma coincidência descoberta, uma coincidência que não apenas é, mas também realmente se mostrou. Mas esse pensamento realmente nos ajudou a dizer o que é um fenômeno? Nós realmente nos ajudamos a distinguir a diferença entre manifestação e mera existência, entre o fato de que algo é e o fato de que algo se mostra? Afinal, a mente também é algo que simplesmente é, a mente também é uma coisa existente. Como podemos entender o fenômeno, em manifestando-se como tal?

Como se vê, o problema está começando a se tornar mais difícil e mais complicado. Nós trouxemos a mente para isso porque ela se preocupa com algo diferente do que é ela mesma e porque, para isso, parece fundamental que exista algo como uma relação com outra coisa, algo que possa aparecer. Mas assim que começamos a olhar para a mente como algo existente, surpreendentemente de pronto o fenômeno começa a decair. Começamos a pensar que o que se manifesta deve pertencer ao sendo, à existência da mente, que é como se fosse seu momento ou parte. Assim, aquilo de que precisamos para que algo se mostre começa a desmoronar, e começamos a ter diante de nós a estrutura da mente, que também tem vários aspectos, momentos e assim por diante. Mas esses momentos e aspectos pertencem a ele meramente como seus aspectos, e isso significa que a mente se mostra para nós como uma coisa e nada mais se mostra dentro dela a não ser ela mesma. Mas isso, afinal, é verdade para todo tipo de existência: é e tem seus próprios aspectos e momentos. Mas onde está então o fenômeno?

<tabbox Erika Abrams>
Commençons par le phénomène. Qu’est-ce que ce mot évoque pour nous ? Il nous dit que quelque chose non seulement est là, mais encore se montre. Or ce n’est pas n’importe quelle chose qui [23] se montre. D’un côté les choses sont telles qu’en elles-mêmes et, de l’autre... elles se montrent. Il ne faudrait pas croire pour autant que notre problème soit celui de la connaissance, que notre réflexion doive porter sur la discipline philosophique spécialisée qui se nomme théorie de la connaissance. Les choses se montrent également là où la fin visée n’est pas directement la connaissance. Partout où il y va d’un comportement humain, où l’humain entre en considération, nous nous trouvons en présence non seulement de choses qui sont, mais de choses qui se montrent. Alors précisément que l’homme ne veut pas seulement connaître mais veut en même temps agir, qu’il s’oriente par rapport au bien et au mal, il faut que quelque chose se montre à lui. Ce qu’il qualifie de bon et de mauvais doit se montrer à lui et, comme le bien et le mal sont quelque chose qui nous concerne, nous devons en même temps nous montrer à nous-mêmes. Le phénomène signifie en ce sens la manifestation de l’étant, le fait que les choses non seulement sont, mais sont manifestes. Bien sûr, en un sens le phénomène aussi est, et, en tant qu’il est, il est à sa manière une chose. Nous sommes donc amenés à nous demander quel est le rapport entre les deux : la chose et la manifestation, la manifestation étante et la chose se manifestant. Comment les deux se distinguent-elles l’une de l’autre ? Où et comment se recouvrent-elles, se recoupent-elles ?

A première vue, cela peut paraître un problème accessoire ou secondaire. Il est clair que, si quelque chose a à se manifester, il faut avant tout que ce qui se manifeste soit. Il est clair alors que la manifestation, précisément parce qu’elle est manifestation d’une chose étante et qu’elle-même est, doit être susceptible d’une détermination comme aspect, propriété ou rapport au sein de l’étant même qui se manifeste ou, le cas échéant, d’autres étants nécessaires pour qu’un quelque chose se montre. Il y a en effet des structures étantes réelles qui nous viennent à l’esprit dès que nous commençons à réfléchir sur l’apparition : une image à la surface de l’eau ou dans un miroir. Nous savons bien que derrière le reflet qui apparaît dans le miroir il y a un processus physique, il y a la réflexion de la lumière lors de laquelle certaines structures se reproduisent — certains traits géométriques de l’objet sont reproduits par les traits géométriques de la formation optique produite par la réflexion des ondes lumineuses. Ce processus ne nous montre-t-il pas comment l’image apparaît dans le miroir ? Or, s’il est vrai que l’apparition de l’image dans le miroir s’accompagne de certaines concordances structurales, celles-ci ne sont ni plus ni moins des phénomènes que la lumière ou le miroir lui-même qui [24] les réfléchit. La concordance de la structure est un fait objectif, une chose, de même que la lumière, le miroir, etc. Où dans ce processus, où parmi ces choses est le se-montrer des choses ? Où est la manifestation ?

Peut-être serons-nous plus avancés en ajoutant encore un élément. Afin que quelque chose se manifeste, il faut qu’il se manifeste, qu’il apparaisse, à quelqu’un. Il faut qu’il y ait là quelque chose comme le vécu ou la pensée qui se préoccupe toujours — ou du moins normalement, principalement — d’autre chose qu’elle-même. On peut dire dès lors : c’est donc pour la pensée que les choses se manifestent ; il se montre à elle autre chose qu’elle-même. Dans le cas de la réflexion d’un objet dans un miroir, nous n’avons que des phénomènes objectifs. C’est seulement lorsque la pensée arrive et constate l’accord entre l’objet du reflet et le reflet, que nous nous trouvons en présence d’un accord mis à découvert, d’une concordance qui s’est montrée, qui non seulement est, mais qui encore s’est effectivement manifestée. Pourtant, la pensée nous permet-elle réellement de dire ce qu’est le phénomène ? Fait-elle réellement surgir la différence entre la manifestation et le simple étant, entre le fait que quelque chose est et le fait que quelque chose se montre ? La pensée aussi est une chose étante. Comment mettre le doigt sur le phénomène, sur la manifestation en tant que telle ?

Comme on le voit, le problème se complique. Nous avons fait appel à la pensée parce qu’elle s’occupe d’autre chose qu’elle-même, parce que le rapport à autre chose, à quelque chose qui peut se découvrir, semble donc lui être fondamental. Mais dès que nous regardons la pensée comme quelque chose d’étant, le phénomène en tant que tel nous échappe à nouveau, il nous semble que ce qui se découvre appartient en quelque sorte à l’être, à l’étant même de la pensée, en tant que moment ou partie constituante. Ce que nous avions cru nécessaire pour que quelque chose se montre commence à se dissiper sous nos yeux, nous laissant devant la structure de la pensée, laquelle a naturellement différents aspects et moments, qui cependant lui appartiennent simplement en tant que ses aspects, ce qui signifie alors que la pensée se montre à nous comme une chose : il ne se montre en elle rien d’autre qu’elle-même. En dernière analyse la même chose vaut d’ailleurs pour tout étant. Chaque étant a différents aspects et moments. Où donc est le phénomène ?

Nous n’allons pas répondre à cette question tout de suite. Nous voulons la laisser se déployer autant que possible sous forme de [25] problème. Quoi qu’il en soit, il est clair que nous travaillons toujours à l’intérieur de l’expérience que nous avons du fait que quelque chose nous apparaît, quelque chose se montre, du fait tout simplement que quelque chose est là — comme on dit — pour nous. En un sens il faudrait dire même que tout se montre à nous. Et que, en général, — pour autant qu’il y a dans notre rapport aux choses et aux autres quelque chose de l’ordre de l’existence, en tant que nous possédons un savoir sur eux et que nous nous orientons au milieu d’eux — nous travaillons toujours avec le fait que les choses nous apparaissent. Nous travaillons avec le concept d’apparition, sans que ce concept lui-même soit clair pour nous. D’un côté, il est ce qu’il y a de plus courant, de plus usuel, mais, de l’autre, parvenir au phénomène en tant que tel, accéder à la manifestation, n’est pas chose aisée.

Si, en un sens, tout nous apparaît à tout moment, tout ne se manifeste pas en même guise. Ce qui se montre à nous possède un arrière-plan, un champ d’où il ressort. A chacun d’entre nous ce champ paraît un peu différent, pour chacun le centre de gravité est différent, chacun se meut autrement dans ce champ dont l’environnement immédiatement donné aux sens nous fournit un exemple. Pourtant, ce champ n’est pas autre chose qu’un champ, il n’est pas un ensemble de choses délimitées : dans ce champ est également manifesté ce qui n’est pas tout à fait manifeste. Ceci que voici, ce qui se montre en tant que présent, me montre aussi autre chose, quelque chose qui ne m’est pas directement présent mais qui indubitablement est là, qui est en quelque sorte indiqué là à l’intérieur de ce qui m’est présent. Le non-présent aussi se montre avec l’indice « là ». Il nous est impossible de dire jusqu’où s’étend cette manifestation indirecte. De l’entourage immédiat, cela nous renvoie à un entourage plus éloigné qui, quand bien même il nous serait inconnu, n’en inclut pas moins en soi la certitude qu’il est et qu’il est sur un style qui, en un sens, nous est familier. Ce style renvoie de plus en plus loin, pour embrasser finalement tout ce qui est — avec certaines variations et modifications. Tout ce qui est se montre à nous d’une manière ou d’une autre, bien que ce ne soit pas au sens de ce qui s’est montré à nous explicitement, comme présent « en personne ». Mais le se-montrer, l’apparaître, est-ce donc uniquement la présence « en personne » ?

En effet, il y a des différences fondamentales. Ce que j’ai là directement sous les yeux — ce livre, vos personnes —, cela est présent en personne, dans son originalité. Il y a d’autres choses qui ne sont pas présentes de façon aussi originale ; ainsi ce qui se [26] trouve dans le couloir ne m’est pas maintenant accessible de la même manière. Je pourrais le caractériser par conjecture, puis, en y allant, constater qu’il en va tout autrement. Il y a un mode d’apparaître douteux, un mode d’apparaître probable, etc., et nous avons des manières de nous convaincre de ce qui se montre et de transformer une telle incertitude ou probabilité en certitude ou, au contraire, de transformer ce qui était une certitude apparente en doute, en probabilité, etc. Cela dit, il importe de se rendre compte d’une chose qui est d’une importance primordiale : toutes nos conjectures, toutes nos opinions sont un se-montrer sui generis, et chaque manifestation se produit dans le cadre de cette manifestation universelle, de cette manifestation du tout. Chaque manifestation originale, qui me convainc de quelque manière et à l’intérieur de laquelle la chose est là « en personne », se situe dans le cadre de cette manifestation générale. Chaque thèse individuelle fait partie d’une thèse générale. Qu’est-ce qu’une thèse ? Une thèse, c’est un se-montrer qui me donne une conviction suffisante pour me faire dire de la chose : elle est.

Nous venons donc d’exposer longuement et ennuyeusement une grande trivialité. Notre vie tout entière se déroule dans cette manifestation des choses et dans notre orientation au milieu d’elles, notre vie est continuellement déterminée jusqu’en son fond par le fait que les choses se montrent et qu’elles se montrent dans leur totalité. Comment sommes-nous parvenus à cette totalité ? Par le fait que chaque chose singulière dans notre champ nous est apparue comme faisant partie d’un environnement qui, pas à pas, nous a conduits de plus en plus loin, jusqu’à ce que nous ayons reconnu la nécessité d’une structure non arbitraire de ce qui se montre. La question est maintenant de savoir si cette structure appartient à la manifestation ou aux choses mêmes qui se manifestent.

<tabbox Petr Lorn>
What does phenomenon mean? We could start with this. The standard translation is “apparition/appearance.” What do we usually associate with the word appearance? Something not only is here but also shows itself. Not every thing also shows itself. On the one hand, things are in themselves and are what they are; on the other hand, they show themselves. It seems that this is about the problem of knowing, as if our consideration regarded a specialized philosophical discipline, called the theory of cognizance. But things also show themselves even where the purpose is not directly cognizing. Everywhere concerning human activity, as we are used to defining it as the human, everywhere where precisely the human comes into consideration, there before us, we have not only things that are but also things that show themselves. Just when man wants to know, when he at the same time wants to act, when he orients himself with respect to good and evil, everywhere there something—and this is obvious—has to show itself. Just that which he marks as good and evil has to show itself to him. And naturally, because good and evil are something that regards us, at the same time we show ourselves to ourselves. Phenomenon then, in this sense means the showing of existence·, things not only are but also they are manifest. An appearance/apparition naturally in a certain sense is, in its own way, also a specific thing. Then it is easy to pose the question of how these two are related: thing and apparition/appearance; or the existing apparition and the manifesting-itself thing. How are they distinguished and how do they overlap, how do they meet?

It looks like a secondary problem, like something of second rank. After all, it is obvious that if something is to manifest itself, then in the first place there has to be that which manifests itself. Manifesting just because it is the manifesting of something existing and itself is, after all, to be specified as some kind of feature, some kind of characteristic, a relation in the existent manifesting itself, or eventually in some kind of other existents, which are necessary so that something manifests itself. For certainly there are actual structures of existents where it is obvious to think, straight away, when we think about it, that something manifests itself: a reflection in water, in a mirror. An image appears in a mirror. And we know well enough that behind something like this image lies a certain physical process, that there exists a reflection of light and that the reflection of light has certain structures that are reproduced, that is, certain geometrical features of objects are reproduced by geometrical features of optical formations that arise [17] from the reflection of rays of light. This is after all something that already shows us how the image in a mirror appeared. Except that the image appeared in the mirror. Certain structural coincidences took place, but these structural coincidences are not more or less phenomena than the mirror itself and the light that reflects it. The coincidence of structure is after all just as objective a fact as the mirror, light, and so on. Each is also a thing as well. Where then do we have something like appearing, manifesting itself?

Perhaps the thing will be different if we say that it is still necessary to add something. In order that something manifests itself, it is necessary that it manifests, appears to someone. Something like mind or experience is needed. Mind is something that is always occupied—or at least under normal circumstances—with something other than itself. It also occupies itself with itself, but above all it occupies itself with something else. Already it is possible to say here: for mind something shows itself, something different shows itself than that which it is itself. In the case of objects reflecting in a mirror, we still only have material objects, and only when mind comes and posits the coincidence between the object of reflection and the reflecting do we have a discovered coincidence, a coincidence that not only is but also really has shown itself. But has this thought really helped us to say what is a phenomenon? Have we really helped ourselves distinguish the difference between manifesting and mere existence, between the fact that something is and the fact that something shows itself? After all, mind is also something that just is, mind is also an existing thing. How can we get a grasp on phenomenon, on manifesting as such?

As you see, the problem is starting to become more difficult and more entangled. We brought mind into this because it concerns itself with something other than what it is itself, and because for it, it seems fundamental that there is something like a relation to something else, something that can appear. But as soon as we start to look at mind like something existent, then surprisingly right away the phenomenon as such begins to decay. We start to think that what manifests itself has to belong to the being, the existence of mind, that it is as if it were its moment or part. Thus, that which we need so that something will show itself starts to break down, and we begin to have before us the structure of mind, which also of course has various aspects, moments, and so on. But these moments and aspects belong to it merely as its aspects, and that means that mind shows itself to [18] us as a thing and nothing else shows itself within it other than it itself. But this, after all, is true of every kind of existent: it is and has its own aspects and moments. But where then is the phenomenon?

We do not want to answer this question right away. As far as possible, we want to let it ripen in the form of a problem. But in any case, it is clear that we are still working within our experience that something appears to us, something shows itself, that basically for us—as is said—something is here. In fact, in a certain sense, we have to say that everything shows itself to us. And that in general, as long as in our relation to things and to those near us there is something like clarity, that we somehow know about them, that we orient ourselves within them, that we are always working with that, that things appear to us. We work with the concept of appearing; yet at the same time this concept itself is not clear to us. On the one hand, it is the most common, the most regular; on the other hand, to get to the phenomenon as such, to get to the appearing is not, as you see, so obvious: it is a difficult thing.

I said that, in a certain sense, everything is constantly appearing to us—naturally, everything not in the same way. That which manifests itself to us has a certain center of gravity. To each of us, this core appears slightly differently, each of us would move around in this core a little differently. The crux of that which manifests itself to us, is our immediate perceptual environment. It shows itself. But then there is the very strange reality, that this core is just merely a center of gravity; it is not the combination of some specified things: within this core is simultaneously manifested that which is not so entirely manifestable. What is present here, what shows itself as present, also shows me something further, something that is not directly present, but that undoubtedly is here and somehow indicated in my presence. This means that the nonpresent also shows itself here. When we ask where are the boundaries of this indirect showing, this showing through our center of gravity, we are unable to answer. It sends us from our immediate surroundings to more distant ones, and these more distant surroundings, which perhaps might be unfamiliar to us, still bring with them the certainty that they are and that their style is in a certain sense familiar. And this entire style leads further and further away and in the end encompasses everything that is—with certain alterations and modifications. Everything that is in some way shows itself to us—of course not in the sense of something explicitly and in the original showing itself. But is showing-appearing—just showing in its original?

Of course, there are substantial differences here. What we have directly before our eyes, this book, your persons—these are here in the original. There are other things that are not here so originally. For example, what is out there in the hallway is not accessible to me in the same way. I could express let us say some kind of conjecture about that and characterize it. Then it might be shown, if I would step outside, that it was not like that. There are ways of dubious showing, there are ways of probable showing, and so on—and there are methods for convincing oneself about what is showing itself, and how to change this uncertainty and probability into certainty, or else to transform what seemed to be an apparent certainty into doubt, into probability, and so on. At the same time it is also important to realize that—and this is an extremely consequential thought—that all our conjectures, all our opinions are a showing itself of its own kind and that every original showing that somehow convinces me, when that thing itself is here, nonetheless still is within the framework of this universal showing. Every individual thesis is a part of the universal thesis. What is a thesis? Thesis, that is showing itself, which convinced me so far that I say about that thing: it is.

We have now described in a long-about and boring way a kind of large triviality. All our life takes place within the very showing of things and in our orientation among them. Our life is constantly profoundly determined by the fact that things show themselves and that they show themselves in their totality. How did we really get to this totality? We got to it by that; every singular thing in our center of gravity appeared to us as part of its surroundings and this surrounding led us step by step further and further. Here, a certain structure of what shows itself as indispensable, not-freely chosen, as something that must be within this manifesting, showed itself. Does this belong to the part of manifesting, or does it belong to the part of things themselves, to the aspect of things that manifest themselves?

</tabbox>