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--- estudos:wrathall:wrathall-2021108-109-em-si-inalcancavel [26/01/2026 12:54] – mccastro
+++ estudos:wrathall:wrathall-2021108-109-em-si-inalcancavel [09/02/2026 20:16] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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+===== EM-SI INALCANÇÁVEL (2021:108-109) =====
+We surely should indeed resist the thought that our thinking is parochial — or otherwise less-than-objective — simply by virtue of being “restricted” to addressing entities “within a definite kind of seeing” of them. To be free of such a “restriction” — in order to glimpse, as we might imagine, the “in-itself” — would seem to be to ask of the world a question that is Not “adequately defined,” asking how it is — how it is ordered — but with no answer to the prior question, “Ordered with regard to what?” (GA21:284). So one possibility worth exploring is that Heidegger’s viewpoint opposes only “an utterly fantastic kind of objectivity,” the unattainability of which provides no reason to believe we cannot attain objectivity properly understood: from this perspective, one might well say that “inferring relativism and skeptical historicism from the (109) fact that an ‘in-itself’ cannot be found is only the flip-side of the same misunderstanding” (GA62:372/171, 372/172).
+(WRATHALL, Mark A.. The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021)
+{{tag>Wrathall}}