estudos:sallis:sallis-1996-afirmacao-e-negacao
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| + | ====== afirmação e negação (1996) ====== | ||
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| + | //Data: 2025-03-11 21:51// | ||
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| + | (Sallis1996) | ||
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| + | The Stranger says that in logos there is phasis and apophasis. The usual translation is: affirmation and negation. But, in order even to prepare for a re-thinking of what is at issue in these words,((Cf. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze GA7, p. 244.)) we must cease being captivated by the cloak of obviousness which the translation tends to cast over the issue. What is essential is that phasis and apophasis not be refined away into operations of “logical thought”—that, | ||
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| + | The Stranger says that when such phasis and apophasis occur silently, in dianoia, the outcome is opinion. And when the coming about of this condition is mixed with sensation, the result is appearance (phantasia). Hence, the Stranger says: “What we mean when we say ‘it appears’ phainetai is a mixture of sensation and opinion” (Sofista 264 a-b). What is important here is not only the ascription of visible images to appearance—which we have seen attested to most elegantly in the Republic, especially in the cave image-but, even more, the ascription to it of opinion, hence dianoia, hence logos. The result is that appearance can no longer be regarded as set absolutely over against logos—that, | ||
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