| What does Heidegger mean by "being"? The single most important point to grasp at the outset is that being is Not itself something that exists: it is neither one entity among others, nor the totality of entities (das Seiende), nor a property of entities. The difference between being and entities is what Heidegger, soon after writing Being and Time, calls the "ontological difference" (GA24: 22). Since his question concerns being, and since being is not an entity, Heidegger is not primarily interested in the central question of traditional ontology: what is there? Are there forms and universals or only particulars? Does God exist? Is there such a thing as substance or are there only properties? Is the mind physical? Do we have free will? Are we and everything else ultimately will to power? These are metaphysical questions; they are questions about entities, not about being. They are, in Heidegger's jargon, "ontic" as opposed to "ontological." Moreover, by fixing our attention exclusively on entities, Heidegger believes, such questions tend to eclipse and obscure the question of being. The difference is not just one of generality, for Heidegger also distinguishes the question of being from what he later calls "the fundamental question of metaphysics," namely, why is there something rather than nothing? (GA40: ch. 1) The question of being is not about what there is or even why there is anything, but rather what it is for what there is - whatever it is, and for whatever reason there is any of it - to be. | What does Heidegger mean by "being"? The single most important point to grasp at the outset is that being is Not itself something that exists: it is neither one entity among others, nor the totality of entities (das Seiende), nor a property of entities. The difference between being and entities is what Heidegger, soon after writing Being and Time, calls the "ontological difference" (GA24: 22). Since his question concerns being, and since being is not an entity, Heidegger is not primarily interested in the central question of traditional ontology: what is there? Are there forms and universals or only particulars? Does God exist? Is there such a thing as substance or are there only properties? Is the mind physical? Do we have free will? Are we and everything else ultimately will to power? These are metaphysical questions; they are questions about entities, not about being. They are, in Heidegger's jargon, "ontic" as opposed to "ontological." Moreover, by fixing our attention exclusively on entities, Heidegger believes, such questions tend to eclipse and obscure the question of being. The difference is not just one of generality, for Heidegger also distinguishes the question of being from what he later calls "the fundamental question of metaphysics," namely, why is there something rather than nothing? (GA40: ch. 1) The question of being is not about what there is or even why there is anything, but rather what it is for what there is - whatever it is, and for whatever reason there is any of it - to be. |
