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estudos:caputo:caputo-meht141-143-heidegger-e-misticismo [16/01/2026 14:40] – created - external edit 127.0.0.1estudos:caputo:caputo-meht141-143-heidegger-e-misticismo [25/01/2026 19:41] (current) – mccastro
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-===== Caputo (MEHT:141-143) – HEIDEGGER E MISTICISMO =====+===== HEIDEGGER E MISTICISMO (MEHT:141-143) =====
 The first of these consists in taking into account Heidegger’s occasional disclaimers that his thought is some form of mysticism (cf. SD, 57/ 53; 79/71). Even in SG  itself he says that his talk of the withdrawal of Being is Not to be construed as a dark, “mystical” utterance (SG (GA10), 183). Heidegger’s strongest statement in this regard, and the one that appears to be the most damaging for the present study, is to be found in the Nietzsche lectures, where he criticizes mysticism as “the mere antitype (Gegenbild) to metaphysics” (Nietzsche (GA6) II, 28). This appears to be an especially serious remark for the thesis of this book. For if mysticism is the mere antitype to metaphysics, then it does not represent a model for the overcoming of metaphysics. Rather mysticism is itself caught up within metaphysics and represents the mere inverse of metaphysical coin. Heidegger appears then to be taking two different positions. On the one Hand he criticizes mysticism as a form of irrationalism and obscurantism and as a flight from the sensible world. But on the other hand, in SG (GA10), he suggests a positive parallel between the thinker and the mystic and lets a mystical poet be guide of the leap beyond Leibniz’s metaphysical principle. The solution to this dilemma is not hard to find. Heidegger writes of Silesius’s saying about the rose: The first of these consists in taking into account Heidegger’s occasional disclaimers that his thought is some form of mysticism (cf. SD, 57/ 53; 79/71). Even in SG  itself he says that his talk of the withdrawal of Being is Not to be construed as a dark, “mystical” utterance (SG (GA10), 183). Heidegger’s strongest statement in this regard, and the one that appears to be the most damaging for the present study, is to be found in the Nietzsche lectures, where he criticizes mysticism as “the mere antitype (Gegenbild) to metaphysics” (Nietzsche (GA6) II, 28). This appears to be an especially serious remark for the thesis of this book. For if mysticism is the mere antitype to metaphysics, then it does not represent a model for the overcoming of metaphysics. Rather mysticism is itself caught up within metaphysics and represents the mere inverse of metaphysical coin. Heidegger appears then to be taking two different positions. On the one Hand he criticizes mysticism as a form of irrationalism and obscurantism and as a flight from the sensible world. But on the other hand, in SG (GA10), he suggests a positive parallel between the thinker and the mystic and lets a mystical poet be guide of the leap beyond Leibniz’s metaphysical principle. The solution to this dilemma is not hard to find. Heidegger writes of Silesius’s saying about the rose:
  
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