estudos:caputo:caputo-meht-11-15-do-desapego
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| + | ====== Do Desapego (MEHT: | ||
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| + | //Data: 2022-09-22 20:30// | ||
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| + | ==== The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought ==== | ||
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| + | === 2. Meister Eckhart: “On Detachment” === | ||
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| + | {Do Desapego} é uma tentativa de Eckhart de retratar o “desprendimento” (Abgeschiedenheit) como a mais alta de todas as virtudes. O desapego é o pináculo e a coroa das virtudes; se a alma possui desapego, possuirá também todas as virtudes menores. O “desapego” não é uma das virtudes morais usuais de que os filósofos tradicionalmente falam em seus tratados sobre ética. De fato, para usar uma distinção kierkegaardiana, | ||
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| + | On Detachment is an attempt by Eckhart to portray “detachment” (Abgeschiedenheit) as the highest of all the virtues. Detachment is the pinnacle and crown of the virtues; if the soul possesses detachment it will possess all the lesser virtues as well. “Detachment” is not one of the usual moral virtues that philosophers traditionally speak of in their treatises on ethics. As a matter of fact, to use a Kierkegaardian distinction, | ||
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| + | The key to Meister Eckhart’s claim that detachment is higher than all other virtues lies in the fact that God Himself is pure detachment: | ||
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| + | God is “detached” for Eckhart because He is the highest, most completely “separate” substance possible — the ens separatissimum, | ||
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| + | While changes occur among creatures, God Himself remains the same, standing in immutable detachment. It was for this reason that God told Moses to tell the Pharaoh that “He who is” had sent him. “This is as much as to say,” Eckhart comments, “that He who is there unchangeably [remaining] in Himself has sent me” (DW, V, 543/C1., 166). | ||
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| + | If God Himself is pure detachment, then the way of the soul to God is the way of detachment. This is what we might call the “logic” of the way of the soul to God, or what Heidegger would call “the way one moves along the path” (die Art der Bewegtheit: SD, 51/47): | ||
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| + | Detachment is the key to the mystical union in Eckhart. That is why it is superior to any moral virtue. For the virtues always have to do in one way or another with creatures, whereas by detachment the soul is related immediately to God Himself. There is a rule of inverse proportions in detachment: | ||
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| + | In the manner of a mystic who is also a scholastic magister — one is reminded of Heidegger’s remark in the Habilitationsschrift about the unity of mysticism and scholasticism in the Middle Ages — Eckhart provides us with some proofs of the primacy of detachment. Thus he argues that detachment is higher than love and humility. Love is praised above all the virtues by St. Paul (1 Corinthians 13:1); but for Meister Eckhart detachment is higher still than love. For by love, he says, I am able “to suffer all things for God’s sake” (DW, V, 540/C1., 161). But when a man endures something he still retains a relationship to that created thing from which his suffering comes. Whereas by detachment “I am receptive of nothing other than God” (DW, V, 539/C1., 161) and “completely free from all creatures” (DW, V, 540/C1., 161). Detachment makes the soul receptive of nothing other than God because, by detaching itself from everything creaturely, the soul brings itself so near to being “nothing” at all that only the Nothing itself, God, can take up residence there: | ||
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| + | God lives in immovable detachment from everything created, and the soul assimilates itself to God by detaching its affections — its “heart” — from all creatures, including even itself. | ||
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| + | The same kind of argument is made against the primacy of humility. By humility, a man lowers himself before creatures and therefore maintains himself in a relation to creatures. But detachment wishes to be neither above creatures nor below them. It wishes to have no relation at all to them. It does not wish to be “this or that,” or to be anything at all: | ||
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| + | By detachment, the soul lets God be all, and it wishes only to let God’s will obtain throughout. It purifies itself of itself in order to let God directly inhabit it. That is why Meister Eckhart quotes St. Paul: “I live now not I but Christ lives in me” (Galatians 2:20). | ||
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| + | Eckhart’s doctrine of “immovable detachment” leads him to make a most important distinction between the “inner man” and the “outer man.” The outer man is a man of “sensation, | ||
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| + | If the inner man wishes to turn his mind’s eye to something “high and noble,” then the soul can summon all its powers back from the senses and devote them exclusively to the object of inward contemplation. In such a state, the inner man is literally “out of his senses” (DW, V, 544/C1., 166), not in the sense of the one who is deranged, but in the sense of the one who is “rapt” (verzückt) in a contemplation of divine things. The object of this inner contemplation is described by Eckhart as “a cognitive representation or a cognition without image.” According to Quint, Eckhart is alluding to a text of St. Thomas in which Aquinas distinguishes two different ways in which the soul can be “rapt” (rapitur) in intellectual contemplation without the use of either senses or imagination: | ||
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| + | In other words, in Eckhart’s view, the possibility is open to the interior man to rise to a contemplation of the divine essence either by means of a form or idea which is directly implanted in it by God, or by means of a completely non-representational cognition (ohne Bilde). By means of his senses, a man dwells among things and the representation (Bild, Bildvorstellung) of things. But the detached man, who is the inner man, removes himself from both things and their representations, | ||
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| + | Eckhart concludes this treatise by asking two questions concerning detachment which are quite helpful in determining its true character. The first question is: what is the object of pure detachment? To this Eckhart answers that “. . . neither this nor that is the object of pure detachment” (DW, V, 544/C1., 167). The object (Gegenstand; | ||
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| + | ---- | ||
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| + | //CAPUTO, John D.. The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986// | ||
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