Wahrheit des Seyns, verdade do seer, truth of be-ing, verdad del Ser, truth of beyng

Ahora bien, ¿qué es lo que debe tomarse en consideración para desformalizar el concepto formal de fenómeno y convertirlo en un concepto fenomenológico, y cómo se distingue éste del vulgar? ¿Qué es eso que la fenomenología debe «hacer ver»? ¿A qué se debe llamar «fenómeno» en un sentido eminente? ¿Qué es lo que por esencia necesariamente debe ser tema de una mostración explícita? Evidentemente, aquello que de un modo inmediato y regular precisamente no se muestra, aquello que queda oculto en lo que inmediata y regularmente se muestra, pero que al mismo tiempo es algo que pertenece esencialmente a lo que inmediata y regularmente se muestra, hasta el punto de constituir su sentido y fundamento (NotaH: Verdad del ser). (SZ:35; STRivera:55)

The expression does not mean “truth” (Wahrheit) “about” be-ing (Seyn), as if it were the conclusion of correct propositions about the concept of be-ing or were an irrefutable “doctrine” of be-ing. Even if such would be appropriate for be-ing (which is impossible), one would have to presuppose, not only that there is a “truth” about be-ing, but above all of what kind that truth really is, the truth in which be-ing comes to stand. But from where else should what is ownmost to this truth and thus to truth as such be determined, except from be-ing itself? And that not only in the sense of a “derivation” (Ableitung) from be-ing, but in the sense of effecting this “ownmost” by be-ing – such an effecting in terms of which we cannot access be-ing through any “correct” notions but rather one that belongs solely to the sheltered moments of being-history.

But the expression also does not mean “true” be-ing, as in the unclear meaning of “true” beings in the sense of true or actual. For here once again a concept of “actuality” (Wirklichkeit) is presupposed and laid at the foundation of be-ing as a measure, whereas be-ing not only grants to beings what they are but also and primarily unfolds for itself that truth that is appropriate for what is ownmost to be-ing.

This truth of be-ing is in no way something different from be-ing, but rather its own essential sway (eigenstes Wesen). Hence it depends on the history of be-ing (Geschichte des Seyns), whether be-ing gifts or refuses itself and this truth and thus first of all actually conveys into its history what is of abground. This indication that the current concepts of “truth” and the current failure to differentiate “being” and “beings” lead to a misinterpretation of the truth of be-ing and above all always already presuppose this truth – this very indication can still deteriorate into a mistake if it accepts the conclusion that what counts is to state the unstated “presuppositions (Voraussetzungen),” as if presuppositions could be graspable without what is posited as such having already been grasped. Within beings and the interpretation of beings unto their beingness in the sense of representedness (Vorgestelltheit) (and already of ἰδέα), it makes sense and is correct to go back to “presuppositions” and “conditions (Bedingungen).” Such a return, therefore, has become the basic form of “metaphysical” thinking in manifold modifications, to such a degree that even the overcoming of “metaphysics” toward an inceptual understanding (anfänglichen Verständigung) cannot do without this way of thinking (cf. Being and Time and Vom Wesen des Grundes, here the attempt at a leap into be-ing). (GA65EM:64)

VIDE: (Wahrheit des Seyns->http://hyperlexikon.hyperlogos.info/modules/lexikon/search.php?option=1&term=Wahrheit des Seyns)