Vergnügen, hedone, ἡδονή, plaisir, prazer, pleasure, Wohlbefinden, well-being

This context becomes plain, without qualification, when we look at a determination that Aristotle gives in Book 1, Chapter 11 of the Rhetoric — the determination of the ἡδονή, a determinate mode of being-in-the-world, of “one’s-well-being.” (Sichwohlbefindens) “It is established for us that something’s well-being is a certain movement of the being of the living in its world, and indeed κατάστασις ἁθρόα, a transposing-of-oneself-all-at-once εἰς τήν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, into the genuinely available possibility of the being-there in question, in such a way that it is thereby perceived.” (Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. Iterum edidit A. Roemer. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1914. Α 11, 1369 b 33 sqq.) This κατάστασις refers to nothing other than well-being (Wohlbefinden): being-uplifted in one fell swoop, a specific lightness of being-in-the-world that lies in joy. “Λύπη is the opposite.” (Rhet. Α 11, 1369 b 35) From this determination of the fundamental character of the ἡδονή as such, you can see that “if, then, ἡδονή is something like (a movement, a reversal of the being of living), then the ἡδύ is obviously the uplifting (in opposition to λυπηρόν, “oppressing”). It is the ποιητικόν, that which can make or produce something like the aforementioned disposition (διάθεσις), position, mode of finding oneself.” (Rhet. Α 11, 1369 b 35 sqq.) Therefore the ἡδύ is an ability-to-aright-itself. “What destroys the ἡδονή, the opposed disposition arights: the λυπηρόν, the upsetting.” (Rhet. Α 11, 1370 a 2 sq.) What is to be seen here is that which is genuinely accomplished for being-in-the-world as being-with-one-another by the ἡδονή, that which relates itself to an encountered ἡδύ and to another, and indicates it to another. We will carry out a corresponding consideration for the λόγος. (GA18:48-49; GA18MT:34-35)

Mas são apenas determinados modos do ἀληθεύειν (desvelamento) que são colocados em risco por meio da ἡδονή (do prazer) e da λύπη (dor), (…). “Pois aquilo que dá prazer (Vergnügen) e aquilo que deprime não destroem nem tampouco confundem toda ὑπόληψις (hipótese), mas antes apenas aquela com relação ao πρακτόν (o que precisa ser feito).” (Ética a Nicômaco VI, 5; 1140b 13ss.) Na medida, porém, em que a ἡδονή (o prazer) e a λύπη (dor) pertencem à essência do homem, o homem está constantemente em risco de se encobrir por si mesmo para si mesmo. (GA19:52; GA19MAC:55)

VIDE: (Vergnügen->http://hyperlexikon.hyperlogos.info/modules/lexikon/search.php?option=1&term=Vergnügen)