Veranlassen, Ver-an-lassen, Veranlassung, deixar-agir, deixar-viger, to occasion, to cause, to bring about, to call forth

Onde, porém, se joga o jogo de articulação dos quatro modos [αἰτία] de deixar-viger [Ver-an-lassen]? Eles deixam chegar à vigência [Anwesen] o que ainda não vige. Com isto, são regidos e atravessados, de maneira uniforme, por uma condução [Bringen] que conduz o vigente [Anwesendes] a aparecer [Vorschein]. Platão   nos diz o que é essa condução numa sentença do Banquete (205b): […] “Todo deixar-viger [Veranlassung] ο que passa e procede do não vigente [Nicht-Anwesenden] para a vigência [Anwesen] é ποίησις, é pro-dução [Her-vor-bringen]”. [GA7CFS:16]

faire-venir
deixar-viger

But in what sense do these four different forms of being indebted [aitia] constitute a unity? This question must be raised especially today, now that we have completely forgotten what aition originally meant. Today we understand being responsible for and being indebted to in a moral sense, or we continue to construe them in terms of some making or effecting. Yet for the Greek way of thinking, the four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance, let it come forth into presence (Anwesen). They set something free and start it on its way to arrival. As such, this starting something on its way is at the same time an occasioning, an inducing to come forward (Veranlassen), as well as a leading-forth (Her-vor-hringen). The four ways of occasioning let what is not yet present as such arrive into presence, come-to-presence. In the Symposium, 18 Plato calls this leading-forth out of the non-present into the present poiesis. [KockelmansTB]