Gleichursprünglichkeit  , cooriginarité, igual-originariedade, equiprimordiality, cooriginariedad

«… cooriginariedad…»: en alemán, Gleichursprünglichkeit (destacado en el texto original), literalmente «la igual originariedad». [Rivera  ; STRivera:Notas]

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Two or more different phenomena are equiprimordial (equally original or co-original; gleichursprünglich) if they are mutually interdependent and can only be understood in relation to each other, and if in addition they are not   based on a common, more fundamental, phenomenon. They belong to a common phenomenon and highlight different aspects of it, but are not reducible to it. Furthermore, there is no hierarchy between equiprimordial phenomena, no phenomenon is more basic than the other. Instead, they are equally basic. In particular, equiprimordial phenomena are not derivable from or based on each other.

Heidegger uses the term in his early writings and especially in Being and Time  , where most of the examples of equiprimordial phenomena can be found. In his later works, the term appears only occasionally. Obviously, Heidegger developed the concept of equiprimordiality as a term referring to Husserl  ’s phenomenological investigations, in which Husserl analyzes different aspects of one phenomenon. In his lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1905-10), for example, Husserl describes the complexity of the experience of time and shows that it has several aspects which cannot be reduced to each other. In particular, Husserl’s concepts of pretention and retention in this context mean that our grasping of phenomena in time, like understanding a phrase or listening to music, has to rely equally on past, present, and future. This corresponds quite directly to Heidegger’s claim of the equiprimordiality of past, present, and future as aspects of temporality (SZ 338, 340, 365; cf. also GA20  :377, 406, and GA42  :197).

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VIDE: Gleichursprünglichkeit