INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM SITUATION OF PHILOSOPHY
§ 1 The function of a Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation in phenomenology
§ 2 The distinction between scientific philosophy and worldview philosophy
§ 3 Life philosophy and culture philosophy – the two main groups of contemporary philosophy
§ 4 Life as primal phenomenon and the two problem groups of contemporary philosophy
(a) Life as objectifying and the problem of absolute validity (the problem of the a priori)
(b) Life as experiencing and the problem of the irrational (the problem of lived experience)
§ 5 The phenomenological destruction
(a) The function of phenomenology within the whole of philosophizing
(b) The boundedness of phenomenological destruction to preconception
(c) Philosophy and factical life experience
(d) The application of the destruction in the two problem groups
PART ONE – ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE A PRIORI
§ 6 The six meanings of history and first bringing-out of the pre-delineations in them
§ 7 The right pursuit of the pre-delineations: the explication of the sense-complexes
§ 8 Characterization of relation: the articulation of the sense-complexes according to the sense of relation
§ 9 The role of the historical within the a priori tendency of philosophy
§ 10 Characterization of enactment: the articulation of the sense-complexes according to the sense of enactment
(a) The task of phenomenological dijudication
(b) The phenomenological dijudication of the genuine enactments of the meaning-complexes in question
PART TWO – ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIVED EXPERIENCE
§ 11 The transition to the second problem group and the relation between psychology and philosophy
Section One – The destructing consideration of the Natorpian position
§ 12 The four viewpoints of destruction
§ 13 Natorp’s general reconstructive psychology
(a) The method of reconstruction
(b) The disposition of psychology
§ 14 The carrying-out of the destruction
(a) In which tendency does Natorp approach the complex of lived experience?
(b) Which is the character of unity and manifoldness of the complex of lived experience?
(c) How does the I comport itself in the complex of lived experience?
(d) How is the I itself had?
§ 15 Constitution as guiding preconception
a) The primacy of the method
b) The determination of the problem of the I through the idea of constitution
c) The radicalization of the theoretical in the idea of constitution
d) Enactmental and order-complex
Section Two – The destructing consideration of the Diltheyian position
§ 16 The attitudinal character of Natorp’s philosophy and the expectation of the opposite in Dilthey’s
§ 17 Report on Dilthey’s philosophy
§ 18 The destruction of the Diltheyian philosophy
§ 19 Natorp and Dilthey – the task of philosophy
APPENDIX