Da- SZ §§28, 29, 31

To sum up: in fundamental ontology, it is the thinking of ontological difference that takes us to the disclosure of being as such. Even there, in the disclosure of being, there is a “belonging-together” of being and Dasein as long as t/here (“Da-”) of Dasein stands for the disclosure of being. But the transcendental-horizonally conceived structure of ontological difference could not provide an adequate account of the actual dynamics of this “belonging-together.” On the other hand, the thinking in being-historical perspective glimpses first into the dynamics of the sway of being as enowning. This sway of being comes to pass as a counter-resonance of the enowning forth-throw of being and enowned projecting-opening of Dasein. Thus, the dynamics of the swaying of being shows itself in a genuine onefold of being and Dasein in their needing-belonging relationship. Both the transcendental-horizonally conceived structure of ontological difference as the condition for the possibility of the disclosure of being and the very term “Differenz” seemed to overemphasize the difference so much so that the actual “belonging-together” of being and Dasein was not adequately thematized. Being-historical thinking levels off such inadequacies and provides a more originary account of the “belonging-together” of being and Dasein, on the basis of which the ontological differentiation can be carried out. On account of this, being-historical thinking uses instead of “Differenz” other terminologies like “Unterscheidung” or “Unter-schied” in order to indicate this transformation in the understanding of ontological difference. While “Differenz” could sound like a permanently prevalent state of affair that would preclude any genuine “belonging-together,” the usage “Unterscheidung” has an enactmental tone, implying a dynamics of something being eventually differentiated. And it is to this dynamics that Heidegger’s usage of “Unter-schied” refers. He writes the word “Unter-schied” with the separating hyphen in order to indicate that the first part “unter-” stands for the intimacy of the onefold of the swaying of being, while “-schied” names the separateness and distinction between being and beings. It is the dynamism of the “differentiation” that can appropriately be made only “in the intimacy of the onefold” that is expressed with the term “Unterscheidung.” Elucidating the being-historically understood ontological difference, von Herrmann sums it up saying: “Difference and belonging-together of what is differentiated are grasped differently from the swaying of the truth of be-ing as enowning.” (HTTT)