“For each moment [jeweilig], then, something is completed [fertig] and each being is there in the how of its being [Sein], if, with respect to ἀρετή, nothing is left out from that which relates to the extent of the possible ability-to-be [Seinkönnen] of the being in question.” [Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 21 sqq.] [GA18MT:56]
Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the “with-which” and the “in-which” of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the “towards-this” as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the “for-the-sake-of-which” to which every “towards-which” ultimately goes back – all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility [Verständlichkeit]. And what is that wherein Dasein as Being-in-the-world understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to” [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING for the sake of which it itself is – one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This “in-order-to” prescribes a “towards-this” as a possible “in-which” for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement which something has – an involvement which is with something. Dasein always assigns itself from a “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. BTMR §18
In the act of understanding [Verstehen], which we shall analyse more thoroughly later (Compare Section 31), the relations indicated above must have been previously disclosed; the act of understanding holds them in this disclosedness. It holds itself in them with familiarity; and in so doing, it holds them before itself, for it is in these that its assignment operates. The understanding lets itself make assignments both in these relationships themselves and of them. The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of signifying. In its familiarity with these relationships, Dasein ‘signifies’ to itself: in a primordial manner it gives itself both its Being and its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING as something which it is to understand with regard to its Being-in-the-world. The “for-the-sake-of-which” signifies an “in-order-to”; this in turn, a “towards-this”; the latter, an “in-which” of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the “with-which” of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are a s this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying we call “significance”. This is what makes up the structure of the world – the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is. Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves [in seinem An-sieh]. Dasein as such is always something of this sort; along with its Being, a context of the ready-to-hand is already essentially discovered: Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted itself already to a ‘world’ which it encounters, and this submission1 belongs essentially to its Being. BTMR §18
In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him [ihm vorausspringt] in his existentiell POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it. BTMR §26
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression ‘understanding something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a match for it’, ‘being competent to do something’. In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a “what”, but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility. The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern with the ‘world’, as we have characterized them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to Dasein’s POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING towards itself, for the sake of itself. The Being-possible which Dasein is existentially in every case, is to be sharply distinguished both from empty logical possibility and from the contingency of something present-at-hand, so far as with the present-at-hand this or that can ‘come to pass’. As a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand, possibility as an existentiale is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically. As with existentiality in general, we can, in the first instance, only prepare for the problem of possibility. The phenomenal basis for seeing it at all is provided by the understanding as a disclosive POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. [SZ:144] BTMR §31
Possibility, as an existentiale, does not signify a free-floating potentialityfor-Being in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae). In every case Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities. As the POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which is is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly waiving the possibilities of its Being, or else it seizes upon them and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – thrown possibility through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees. BTMR §31
Understanding is the Being of such POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, which is never something still outstanding as not yet present-at-hand, but which, as something which is essentially never present-at-hand, ‘is’ with the Being of Dasein, in the sense of existence. Dasein is such that in every case it has understood (or alternatively, not understood) that ‘it is to be thus or thus. As such understanding it ‘knows’ what it is capable of – that is, what its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is capable of. This ‘knowing’ does not first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the “there”, which is essentially understanding. And only because Dasein, in understanding, is its “there”, can it go astray and fail to recognize itself. And in so far as understanding is accompanied by state-of-mind and as such is existentially surrendered to thrownness, Dasein has in every case already gone astray and failed to recognize itself. In its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING it is therefore delivered over to the possibility of first finding itself again in its possibilities. BTMR §31
Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of. We must grasp the structure of this existentiale more precisely. BTMR §31
As a disclosure, understanding always pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world. As a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, any Being-in is a potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance, but when that which is within-the-world is itself freed, this entity is freed for its own possibilities. That which is ready-to-hand is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorial whole of a possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand. But even the ‘unity’ of the manifold present-at-hand, of Nature, can be discovered only if a possibility of it has been disclosed. Is it accidental that the question about the Being of Nature aims at the ‘conditions of its possibility’? On what is such an inquiry based? When confronted with this inquiry, we cannot leave aside the question: why are entities which are not of the character of Dasein understood in their Being, if they are disclosed in accordance with the conditions of their possibility? Kant presupposes something of the sort, perhaps rightly. But this presupposition itself is something that cannot be left without demonstrating how it is justified. [SZ:145] BTMR §31
Why does the understanding – whatever may be the essential dimensions of that which can be disclosed in it – always press forward into possibilities? It is because the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call “projection”. With equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein’s Being both upon its “for-the-sake-of-which” and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world. The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being by which the factical POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING gets its leeway [Spielraum]. And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call “projecting”. Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in iccordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities. Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects – that is’ to say, possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities. BTMR §31
Because of the kind of Being which is constituted by the existentiale of projection, Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were able to do so. But Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its, potentialityfor-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, it is not yet. Only because the Being of the “there” receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself ‘Become what you are’, and say this with understanding. BTMR §31
Projection always pertains to the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world; as POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, understanding has itself possibilities, which are sketched out beforehand within the range of what is essentially disclosable in it. Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily into the “for-the-sake-of-which”; that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either authentic, arising out of one’s own Self as such, or inauthentic. The ‘in-‘ of “inauthentic” does not mean that Dasein cuts itself off from its Self and understands ‘only’ the world. The world belongs to Being-one’s-Self as Being-in-the-world. On the other hand, authentic understanding, no less than that which is inauthentic, can be either genuine or not genuine. As POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, understanding is altogether permeated with possibility. When one is diverted into [Sichverlegen in] one of these basic possibilities of understanding, the other is not laid aside [legt … nicht ab]. Because understanding, in every case, pertains rather to Dasein’s full disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, this diversion of the understanding is an existential modification of projection as a whole. In understanding the world, Being-in is always understood along with it, while understanding of existence as such is always an understanding of the world. [SZ:146] BTMR §31
As factical Dasein, any Dasein has already diverted its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING into a possibility of understanding. BTMR §31
The disclosedness of the “there” in understanding is itself a way of Dasein’s POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. In the way in which its Being is projected both upon the “for-the-sake-of-which” and upon significance (the world), there lies the disclosedness of Being in general. Understanding of Being has already been taken for granted in projecting upon possibilities. In projection, Being is understood, though not ontologically conceived. An entity whose kind of Being is the essential projection of Being-in-the-world has understanding of Being, and has this as constitutive for its Being. What was posited dogmatically at an earlier stage now gets exhibited in terms of the Constitution of the Being in which Dasein as understanding is its “there”. The existential meaning of this understanding of Being cannot be satisfactorily clarified within the limits of this investigation except on the basis of the Temporal Interpretation of Being. BTMR §31
As existentialia, states-of-mind and understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. By way of having a mood, Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case. The projection of its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING has been delivered over to the Fact of its thrownness into the “there”. Has not Dasein’s Being become more enigmatical now that we have explicated the existential constitution of the Being of the “there” in the sense of thrown projection? It has indeed. We must first let the full enigmatical character of this Being emerge, even if all we can do is to come to a genuine breakdown over its ‘solution’, and to formulate anew the question about the Being of thrown projective Being-in-the-world. [SZ:148] BTMR §31
As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This Being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust [Rückschlag] upon Dasein. The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility – that of developing itself [sich auszubilden]. This development of the understanding we call “interpretation”. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding. In accordance with the trend of these preparatory analyses of everyday Dasein, we shall pursue the phenomenon of interpretation in understanding the world – that is, in inauthentic understanding, and indeed in the mode of its genuineness. BTMR §32
But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just ‘sense’ it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up. The assimilation of understanding and interpretation to a definite ideal of knowledge is not the issue here. Such an ideal is itself only a subspecies of understanding – a subspecies which has strayed into the legitimate task of grasping the present-at-hand in its essential unintelligibility [Unverständlichkeit]. If the basic conditions which make interpretation possible are to be fulfilled, this must [SZ:153] rather be done by not failing to recognize beforehand the essential conditions under which it can be performed. What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. Because understanding, in accordance with its existential meaning, is Dasein’s own POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, the ontological presuppositions of historiological knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigour held in the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiology, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range. BTMR §32
We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself-hearing. If we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say we have not ‘understood’. Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to … is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thraldom it “belongs” to these. Being-with develops in listening to one another [Aufeinander-hören], which can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. BTMR §34
Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is. Ambiguity not only affects the way we avail ourselves of what is accessible for use and enjoyment, and the way we manage it; ambiguity has already established itself in the understanding as a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, and in the way Dasein projects itself and presents itself with possibilities. Everyone is acquainted with what is up for discussion and what occurs, and everyone discusses it; but everyone also knows already how to talk about what has to happen firstabout what is not yet up for discussion but ‘really’ must be done. Already everyone has surmised and scented out in advance what Others have also surmised and scented out. This Being-on-the scent is of course based upon hearsay, for if anyone is genuinely ‘on the scent’ of anything, he does not speak about it; and this is the most entangling way in which ambiguity presents Dasein’s possibilities so that they will already be stifled.in their power. BTMR §37
However, this tranquillity in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited ‘hustle’ [“Betriebs”]. Being-fallen into the ‘world’ does not now somehow come to rest. The tempting tranquillization aggravates the falling. With special regard to the interpretation of Dasein, the opinion may now arise that understanding the most alien cultures and ‘synthesizing’ them with one’s own may lead to Dasein’s becoming for the first time thoroughly and genuinely enlightened about itself. Versatile curiosity and restlessly “knowing it all” masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite what is really to be understood, and the question has not even been asked. Nor has it been understood that understanding itself is a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which must be made free in one’s ownmost Dasein alone. When Dasein, tranquillized, and ‘understanding’ everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation [Entfremdung] in which its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating. [SZ:178] BTMR §38
But now that falling has been exhibited, have we not set forth a phenomenon which speaks directly against the definition we have used in indicating the formal idea of existence? Can Dasein be conceived as an entity for which, in its Being, its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is an issue, if this entity, in its very everydayness, has lost itself, and, in falling, ‘lives’ away from itself? But falling into the world would be phenomenal ‘evidence’ against the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein were regarded as an isolated “I” or subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. In that case, the world would be an Object. Falling into the world would then have to be re-Interpreted ontologically as Being-present-at-hand in the manner of an entity within-the-world. If, however, we keep in mind that Dasein’s Being is in the state of Being-in-the-world, as we have already pointed out, then it becomes manifest that falling, as a kind of Being of this Being-in, affords us rather the most elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiality. In failing, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon. BTMR §38
Dasein exists factically. We shall inquire whether existentiality and facticity have an ontological unity, or whether facticity belongs essentially to existentiality. Because Dasein essentially has a state-of-mind belonging to it, Dasein has a kind of Being in which it is brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself in its thrownness. But thrownness, as a kind of Being, belongs to an entity which in each case is its possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in terms of them, projecting itself upon them. Being alongside the ready-to-hand, belongs just as primordially to Being-in-the-world as does Being-with Others; and Being-in-the-world is in each case for the sake of itself. The Self, however, is proximally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self. Being-in-the-world is always fallen. Accordingly Dasein’s “average everydayness” can be defined as “Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is an issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others”. BTMR §39
To understand this talk about Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself in falling, we must recall that Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein. That in the face of which one has anxiety [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such. What is the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which anxiety is anxious [sich ängstet] and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially incapable of having an involvement. This threatening does not have the character of a definite detrimentality which reaches what is threatened, and which reaches it with definite regard to a special factical POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not ‘relevant’ at all. Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the presentat-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement. BTMR §40
Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety about something. That which anxiety is profoundly anxious [sich abängstet] about is not a definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it. Indeed the threat itself is indefinite, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factically concrete POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization [vereinzeltes in der Vereinzelung]. [SZ:188] BTMR §40
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING – that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for (propensio in …) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the Being to which Dasein as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over. BTMR §40
That about which anxiety is anxious reveals itself as that in the face of which it is anxious – namely, Being-in-the-world. The selfsameness of that in the face of which and that about which one has anxiety, extends even to anxiousness [Sichängsten] itself. For, as a state-of-mind, anxiousness is a basic kind of Being-in-the-world. Here the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially selfsame in such a way that in the latter the world has been disclosed as world, and Being-in has been disclosed as a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which is individualized, pure, and thrown; this makes it plain that with the phenomenon of anxiety a distinctive state-of-mind has become a theme for Interpretation. Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse’. But this existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world. BTMR §40
Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The phrase ‘is an issue’ has been made plain in the state-of-Being of understanding – of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. In each case Dasein has already compared itself, in its Being, with a possibility of itself. Being-free for one’s ownmost potentialityfor-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety. But ontologically, Being towards one’s ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst … vorweg] in its Being. Dasein is always ‘beyond itself’ [“über sich hinaus”], not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards the POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential ‘is an issue’, we shall denote as Dasein’s “Being-ahead-of-itself”. [SZ:192] BTMR §41
In Being-ahead-of-oneself as Being towards one’s ownmost potentialityfor-Being, lies the existential-ontological condition for the possibility of Being-free for authentic existentiell possibilities. For the sake of its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, any Dasein is as it factically is. But to the extent that this Being towards its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is itself characterized by freedom, Dasein can comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwillingly; it can be inauthentically; and factically it is inauthentically, proximally and for the most part. The authentic “for-the-sake-of-which” has not been taken hold of; the projection of one’s own POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING has been abandoned to the disposal of the “they”. Thus when we speak of “Being-ahead-of-itself”, the ‘itself’ which we have in mind is in each case the Self in the sense of the they-self. Even in inauthenticity Dasein’ remains essentially ahead of itself, just as Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself as it falls, still shows that it has the state-of-Being of an entity for which its Being is an issue. BTMR §41
That very POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING for the sake of which Dasein is, has Being-in-the-world as its kind of Being. Thus it implies ontologically a relation to entities within-the-world. Care is always concern and solicitude, even if only privatively. In willing, an entity which is understood – that is, one which has been projected upon its possibility – gets seized upon, either as something with which one may concern oneself, or as something which is to be brought into its Being through solicitude. Hence, to any willing there belongs something willed, which has already made itself definite in terms of a “for-the-sake-of-which”. If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it: (1) the prior disclosedness of the “for-the-sake-of-which” in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the “wherein” of Being-already); (3) Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly upon a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING towards a possibility of the entity ‘willed’. In the phenomenon of willing, the underlying totality of care shows through. BTMR §41
All the same, this tranquillized ‘willing’ under the guidance of the “they”, does not signify that one’s Being towards one’s POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING has been extinguished, but only that it has been modified. In such a case, one’s Being towards possibilities shows itself for the most part as mere wishing. In the wish Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities which not only have not been taken hold of in concern, but whose fulfilment has not even been pondered over and expected. On the contrary, in the mode of mere wishing, the ascendancy of Being-ahead-of-oneself brings with it a lack of understanding for the factical possibilities. When the world has been primarily projected as a wish-world, Being-in-the-world has lost itself inertly in what is at its disposal; but it has done so in such a way that, in the light of what is wished for, that which is at its disposal (and this is all that is ready-to-hand) is never enough. Wishing is an existential modification of projecting oneself understandingly, when such selfprojection has’ fallen forfeit to thrownness and just keeps hankering after possibilities. Such hankering closes off the possibilities; what is ‘there’ in wishful hankering turns into the ‘actual world’. Ontologically, wishing presupposes care. BTMR §41
3. To Dasein’s state of Being belongs projection – disclosive Being towards its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ and Others or in terms of its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedncss shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity. BTMR §44
What does it mean to ‘presuppose’? It is to understand something as the ground for the Being of some other entity. Such understanding of an entity in its interconnections of Being, is possible only on the ground of disclosedness – that is, on the ground of Dasein’s Being something which uncovers. Thus to presuppose ‘truth’ means to understand it as something for the sake of which Dasein is. But Dasein is already ahead of itself in each case; this is implied in its state-of-Being as care. It is an entity for which, in its Being, its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is an issue. To Dasein’s Being and its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING as Being-in-the-world, disclosedness and uncovering belong essentially. To Dasein its potentialityfor-Being-in-the-world is an issue, and this includes concerning itself with entities within-the-world and uncovering them circumspectively. In Dasein’s state-of-Being as care, in Being-ahead-of-itself, lies the most primordial ‘presupposing’. Because this presupposing of itself belongs to Dasein’s Being, ‘we’ must also presuppose ‘ourselves’ as having the attribute of disclosedness. There are also entities with a character other than that of Dasein, but the ‘presupposing’ which lies in Dasein’s Being does not relate itself to these; it relates itself solely to Dasein itself. The truth which has been presupposed, or the ‘there is’ by which its Being is to be defined, has that kind of Being – or meaning of Being – which belongs to Dasein itself. We must ‘make’ the presupposition of truth because it is one that has been ‘made’ already with the Being of the ‘we’. BTMR §44
What is the status of the fore-sight by which our ontological procedure has hitherto been guided? We have defined the idea of existence as a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING – a potentiality which understands, and for which its own Being is an issue. But this POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated. In starting with average everydayness, our Interpretation has heretofore been confined to the analysis of such existing as is either undifferentiated or inauthentic. Of course, even along this path, it was possible and indeed necessary to reach a concrete determination of the existentiality of existence. Nevertheless, our ontological characterization of the constitution of existence still lacked something essential. “Existence” means a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING – but also one which is authentic. As lofig as the existential structure of an authentic POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING has not been brought into the idea of existence, the fore-sight by which an existential Interpretation is guided will lack primordiality. [SZ:233] BTMR §45
And how about what we have had in advance in our hermeneutical Situation hitherto? How about its fore-having? When and how has our existential analysis received any assurance that by starting with everydayness, it has forced the whole of Dasein – this entity from its ‘beginning’ to its ‘end’ – into the phenomenological view which gives us our theme? We have indeed contended that care is the totality of the structural whole of Dasein’s constitution. But have we not at the very outset of our Interpretation renounced the possibility of bringing Dasein into view as a whole? Everydayness is precisely that Being which is ‘between’ birth and death. And if existence is definitive for Dasein’s Being and if its essence is consituated in part by POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such a potentiality, not yet be something. Any entity whose Essence is made up of existence, is essentially opposed to the possibility of our getting it in our grasp as an entity which is a whole. Not only has the hermeneutical Situation hitherto given us no assurance of ‘having’ the whole entity: one may even question whether “having” the whole entity is attainable at all, and whether a primordial ontological Interpretation of Dasein will not founder on the kind of Being which belongs to the very entity we have taken as our theme. BTMR §45
Thus arises the task of putting Dasein as a whole into our fore-having. This signifies, however, that we must first of all raise the question of this entity’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the ‘end’ itself belongs. The ‘end’ [SZ:232] of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING – that is to say, to existence – limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein. If, however, Dasein’s Being-at-an-end in death, and therewith its Being-a-whole, are to be included in the discussion of its possibly Being-a-whole, and if this is to be done in a way which is appropriate to the phenomena, then we must have obtained an ontologically adequate conception of death – that is to say an existential conception of it. But as something of the character of Dasein, death is only in an existentiell Being towards death [Sein zum Tode]. The existential structure of such Being proves to be the ontologically constitutive state of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. Thus the whole existing Dasein allows itself to be brought into our existential fore-having. But can Dasein also exist authentically as a whole? How is the authenticity of existence to be determined at all, if not with regard to authentic existing? Where do we get our criterion for this? Manifestly, Dasein itself must, in its Being, present us with the possibility and the manner of its authentic existence, unless such existence is something that can be imposed upon it ontically, or ontologically fabricated. But an authentic POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is attested by the conscience. And conscience, as a phenomenon of Dasein, demands, like death, a genuinely existential Interpretation. Such an Interpretation leads to the insight that Dasein has an authentic POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING in that it wants to have a conscience. But this is an existentiell possibility which tends, from the very meaning of its Being, to be made definite in an existentiell way by Being-towards-death. BTMR §45
Thus the investigation comprised in the division which lies before us will now traverse the following stages: Dasein’s possibility of Being-a-whole, and Being-towards-death (Chapter 1); Dasein’s attestation of an authentic POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, and resoluteness (Chapter 2); Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, and temporality as the ontological meaning of care (Chapter 3); temporality and everydayness (Chapter 4); temporality and historicality (Chapter 5); temporality and within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of time (Chapter 6). BTMR §45
The possibility of this entity’s Being-a-whole is manifestly inconsistent with the ontological meaning of care, and care is that which forms the totality of Dasein’s structural whole. Yet the primary item in care is the ‘ahead-of-itself ‘, and this means that in every case Dasein exists for the sake of itself. ‘As long as it is’, right to its end, it comports itself towards its POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. Even when it still exists but has nothing more ‘before it’ and has ‘settled [abgeschlossen] its account’, its. Being is still determined by the ‘ahead-of-itself’. Hopelessness, for instance, does not tear Dasein away from its possibilities, but is only one of its own modes of Being towards these possibilities. Even when one is without Illusions and ‘is ready for anything’ [“Gefasstsein auf Alles”], here too the ‘ahead-of-itself’ lies hidden. The ‘ahead-of-itself ‘, as an item in the structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something still outstanding, which, as a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING for Dasein itself, has not yet become ‘actual’. It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled [eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit]. Such a lack of totality signifies that there is something still outstanding in one’s POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. BTMR §46
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one. BTMR §50
As POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]. As such, death is something distinctively impending. Its existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself. This item in the structure of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death. As a phenomenon, Being-towards-the-end [SZ:251] becomes plainer as Being towards that distinctive possibility of Dasein which we have characterized. BTMR §50
This ownmost possibility, however, non-relational and not to be outstripped, is not one which Dasein procures for itself subsequently and occasionally in the course of its Being. On the contrary, if Dasein exists, it has already been thrown into this possibility. Dasein does not, proximally and for the most part, have any explicit or even any theoretical knowledge of the fact that it has been delivered over to its death, and that death thus belongs to Being-in-the-world. Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state-of-mind which we have called “anxiety”. Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety ‘in the face of’ that POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which is one’s ownmost, nonrelational, and not to be outstripped. That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world itself. That about which one has this anxiety is simply Dasein’s POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of one’s demise. This anxiety is not an accidental or random mood of ‘weakness’ in some individual; but, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end. Thus the existential conception of “dying” is made clear as thrown Being towards its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped. Precision is gained by distinguishing this from pure disappearance, and also from merely perishing, and finally from the ‘Experiencing’ of a demise. BTMR §50
In setting forth average everyday Being-towards-death, we must take our orientation from those structures of everydayness at which we have earlier arrived. In Being-towards-death, Dasein comports itself towards itself as a distinctive POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. But the Self of everydayness is the “they”. The “they” is constituted by the way things have been publicly interpreted, which expresses itself in idle talk. Idle talk must accordingly make manifest the way in which everyday Dasein interprets for itself its Being-towards-death. The foundation of any interpretation is an act of understanding, which is always accompanied by a state-of-mind, or, in other words, which has a mood. So we must ask how Being-towards-death is disclosed by the kind of understanding which, with its state-of-mind, lurks in the idle talk of the “they”. How does the “they” comport itself understandingly towards that ownmost possibility of Dasein, which is non-relational and is not to be outstripped? What state-of-mind discloses to the “they” that it has been delivered over to death, and in what way? BTMR §51
The analysis of the phrase ‘one dies’ reveals unambiguously the kind of Being which belongs to everyday Being-towards-death. In such a way of talking, death is understood as an indefinite something which, above all, must duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is proximally not yet present-at-hand for oneself, and is therefore no threat. The expression ‘one dies’ spreads abroad the opinion that what gets reached, as it were, by death, is the “they”. In Dasein’s public way of interpreting, it is said that ‘one dies’, because everyone else and oneself can talk himself into saying that “in no case is it I myself”, for this “one” is the “nobody”. ‘Dying’ is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular. If idle talk is always ambiguous, so is this manner of talking about death. Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that no one can be my representative, is perverted into an event of public occurrence which the “they” encounters. In the way of talking which we have characterized, death is spoken of as a ‘case’ which is constantly occurring. Death gets passed off as always something ‘actual’; its character as a possibility gets concealed, and so are the other two items that belong to it – the fact that it is non-relational and that it is not to be outstripped. By such ambiguity, Dasein puts itself in the position of losing itself in the “they,” as regards a distinctive POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which belongs to Dasein’s owninost Self. The “they” gives its approval, and aggravates the temptation to cover up from oneself one’s ownmost Being-towards-death. This evasive concealment in the face of death dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in Being with one another, the ‘neighbours’ often still keep talking the ‘dying person’ into the belief that he will escape death and soon return to the tranquillized everydayness of the world of his concern. Such ‘solicitude’ is meant to ‘console’ him. It insists upon bringing him back into Dasein, while in addition it helps him to keep his ownmost non-relational possibility-of-Being completely concealed. In this manner the “they” provides [besorgt] a constant tranquillizalion about death. At bottom, however, this is a tranquillization not only for him who is ‘dying’ but just as much for those who ‘console’ him. And even in the case of a demise, the public is still not to have its own tranquillity upset by such an event, or be disturbed in the carefreeness with which it concerns itself. Indeed the dying of Others is seen often enough as a social inconvenience, if not even a downright tactlessness, against which the public is to be guarded. BTMR §51
[SZ:254] But along with this tranquillization, which forces Dasein away from its death, the “they” at the same time puts itself in the right and makes itself respectable by tacitly regulating the way in which one has to comport oneself towards death. It is already a matter of public acceptance that ‘thinking about death’ is a cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world. The “they” does not permit us the courage anxiety in the face of death. The dominance of the manner in which things have been publicly interpreted by the “they”, has already decided what state-of-mind is to determine our attitude towards death. In anxiety in the face of death, Dasein is brought face to face with itself as delivered over to that possibility which is not to be outstripped. The “they” concerns itself with transforming this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event. In addition, the anxiety which has been made ambiguous as fear, is passed off as a weakness with which no self-assured Dasein may have any acquaintance. What is ‘fitting’ [Was sich … “gehört”] according to the unuttered decree of the “they”, is indifferent tranquillity as to the ‘fact’ that one dies. The cultivation of such a ‘superior’ indifference alienates Dasein from its ownmost nonrelational POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. BTMR §51But temptation, tranquillization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called “falling”. As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death. Being-towards-the-end has the mode of evasion in the face of it – giving new explanations for it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing it. Factically one’s own Dasein is always dying already; that is to say, it is in a Being-towards-its-end. And it hides this Fact from itself by recoining “death” as just a “case of death” in Others – an everyday occurrence which, if need be, gives us the assurance still more plainly that ‘oneself’ is still ‘living’. But in thus falling and fleeing in the face of death, Dasein’s everydayness attests that the very “they” itself already has the definite character of Being-towards-death, even when it is not explicitly engaged in ‘thinking about death’. Even in average everydayness, this ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, is constantly an issue for Dasein. This is the case when its concern is merely in the mode of an untroubled indifferencetowards the uttermost possibility of existence. BTMR §51
In our preliminary existential sketch, Being-towards-the-end has been defined as Being towards one’s ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, which is non-relational and is not to be outstripped. Being towards this possibility, as a Being which exists, is brought face to face with the absolute impossibility of existence. Beyond this seemingly empty characterization of Being-towards-death, there has been revealed the concretion of this Being in the mode of everydayness. In accordance with the tendency to falling, which is essential to everydayness, Being-towards-death has turned out to be an evasion in the face of death – an evasion which conceals. While our investigation has hitherto passed from a formal sketch of the ontological structure of death to the concrete analysis of everyday Being-towards-the-end, the direction is now to be reversed, and we shall arrive at the full existential conception of death by rounding out our Interpretation of everyday Being-towards-the-end. BTMR §52
They say, “It is certain that ‘Death’ is coming.’ They say it, and the “they” overlooks the fact that in order to be able to be certain of death, Dasein itself must in every case be certain of its ownmost nonrelational POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. They say, “Death is certain”; and in saying so, they implant in Dasein the illusion that it is itself certain of its death. And what is the ground of everyday Being-certain? Manifestly, it is not just mutual persuasion. Yet the ‘dying’ of Others is something that one experiences daily. Death is an undeniable ‘fact of experience’. BTMR §52
Authentic Being-towards-death signifies an existentiell possibility of Dasein. This ontical POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING must, in turn, be ontologically possible. What are the existential conditions of this possibility? How are they themselves to become accessible? BTMR §52
Factically, Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in an inauthentic Being-towards-death. How is the ontological possibility of an authentic Being-towards-death to be characterized ‘Objectively’, if, in the end, Dasein never comports itself authentically towards its end, or if, in accordance with its very meaning, this authentic Being must remain hidden from the Others? Is it not a fanciful undertaking, to project the existential possibility of so questionable an existentiell POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING? What is needed, if such a projection is to go beyond a merely fictitious arbitrary construction? Does Dasein itself give us any instructions for carrying it out? And can any grounds for its phenomenal legitimacy be taken from Dasein itself? Can our analysis of Dasein up to this point give us any prescriptions for the ontological task we have now set ourselves, so that what we have before us may be kept on a road of which we can be sure? BTMR §53
Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING means to be able to understand itself in the Being of the entity so revealed – namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentialityfor-Being – that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. How are we to delimit this structure phenomenally? Manifestly, we must do so by determining those characteristics which must belong to an anticipatory disclosure so that it can become the pure understanding of that ownmost possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped – which is certain and, as such, indefinite. It must be noted that understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a meaning, but rather understanding oneself in that POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which reveals itself in projection. BTMR §53
[SZ:263] Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, in which its very Being is the issue. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from the “they”. This means that in anticipation any Dasein can have wrenched itself away from the “they” already. But when one understands that this is something which Dasein ‘can’ have done, this only reveals its factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-self. BTMR §53The ownmost possibility is non-relational. Anticipation allows Dasein to understand that that POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING in which its ownmost Being is an issue, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just ‘belong’ to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the ‘there’ is disclosed for existence. It makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING is the issue. Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord. But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. As structures essential to Dasein’s constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever. Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord. [SZ:264] BTMR §53
The ownmost, non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped. Being towards this possibility enables Dasein to understand that giving itself up impends for it as the uttermost possibility of its existence. Anticipation, however, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one’s own death, one is liberated from one’s lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached. In anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentialityfor-Being which it has understood. It guards itself against ‘becoming too old for its victories’ (Nietzsche). Free for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the end and so are understood as finite [endliche], Dasein dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of Others, or rather that it may explain these possibilities wrongly and force them back upon its own, so that it may divest itself of its ownmost factical existence. As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes – but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING of Others. Since anticipation of the possibility which is not to be outstripped discloses also all the possibilities which lie ahead of that possibility, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance [Vorwegnehmens] in an existentiell manner; that is to say, it includes the possibility of existing as a whole potentialityfor-Being. BTMR §53
The ownmost, non-relational possibility, which is not to be outstripped, is certain. The way to be certain of it is determined by the kind of truth which corresponds to it (disclosedness). The certain possibility of death, however, discloses Dasein as a possibility, but does so only in such a way that, in anticipating this possibility, Dasein makes this possibility possible for itself as its ownmost POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING. The possibility is disclosed because it is made possible in anticipation. To maintain oneself in this truth – that is, to be certain of what has been disclosed – demands all the more that one should anticipate. We cannot compute the certainty of death by ascertaining how many cases of death we encounter. This certainty is by no means of the kind which maintains itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When something present-at-hand has been uncovered, it is encountered most purely if we just look at the entity and let it be encountered in itself. Dasein must first have lost itself in the factual circumstances [Sachverhalte] (this can be one of care’s own tasks and possibilities) if it is to obtain the pure objectivity – that is to say, the indifference – of apodictic evidence. If Being-certain in relation to death does not have this character, this does not mean that it is of a lower grade, but that it does not belong at all to the graded order of the kinds of evidence we can have about the present-at-hand. [SZ:265] BTMR §53
Holding death for true (death is just one’s own) shows another kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-the-world, or to formal objects; for it is certain of Being-in-the-world. As such, holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but demands Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence. In anticipation Dasein can first make certain of its ownmost Being in its totality – a totality which is not to be outstripped. Therefore the evidential character which belongs to the immediate givenness of Experiences, of the “I”, or of consciousness, must necessarily lag behind the certainty which anticipation includes. Yet this is not because the way in which these are grasped would not be a rigorous one, but because in principle such a way of grasping them cannot hold for true (disclosed) something which at bottom it insists upon ‘having there’ as true: namely, Dasein itself, which I myself am, and which, as a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, I can be authentically only by anticipation. BTMR §53
The ownmost possibility, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped, and certain, is indefinite as regards its certainty. How does anticipation disclose this characteristic of Dasein’s distinctive possibility? How does the anticipatory understanding project itself upon a POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING which is certain and which is constantly possible in such a way that the “when” in which the utter impossibility of existence becomes possib