Aristotle says that λóγος (logos) must be in such a way, discourse must be maintained in such a way, “that it turns the speaker (Redner) into someone who is trustworthy,” (Rhet. A 2, 1356 a5 sq) who thus has influence in saying that the matter is such and such, that it is so. And Aristotle says explicitly that through the discourse itself, through the manner and mode in which the one who discourses himself speaks, ἦθος (êthos) must become visible, πίστις must arise out of discourse itself. If we have firm views, then “we trust all the more quickly, and to a greater extent, the decent human beings who make a good impression, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, and above all when the matter is controversial, where there can be arguments on this side and that side, where the matter remains unsettled. It is only settled by the manner and mode in which the speaker offers himself.” (Rhet. A 2, 1356 a6 sqq) The previous treatises held the opinion that ἦθος “contributes nothing to what is πιθανóν (pithanon).” (Rhet. A 2, 1356 a12) People had maintained this view before Aristotle—a point against sophistry. One’s comportment, how one behaves oneself, is the “most excellent” πίστις (pistis) (Rhet. A 2, 1356 a15 sq), the most excellent way for the one discoursing to speak for a matter. (GA18:120-121; GA18MT:82-83)