for-the-sake-of

umwillen

[SZ:84] When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its “involvement”. With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the “towards-which” of serviceability, and the “for-which” of usability. With the “towards-which” of serviceability there can again be an involvement: with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a “hammer”, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection ‘is’ for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein – that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being. Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, what involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements. In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there is no further involvement: this “towards-which” is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary “towards-which” is not just another “towards-this” as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary ‘towards-which’ is a “for-the-sake-of-which”. But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very Being as the sole authentic “for-the-sake-of-which”; for the present, however, we shall pursue this no further. ‘Letting something be involved’ must first be clarified enough to give the phenomenon of worldhood the kind of definiteness which makes it possible to formulate any problems about it. BTMR §18

– the “in-order-to”, the “for-the-sake-of”, and the “with-which” of an involvement – is such that they resist any sort of mathematical functionalization; nor are they merely something thought, first posited in an ‘act of thinking.’ They are rather relationships in which concernful circumspection as such already dwells. This ‘system of Relations’, as something constitutive for worldhood, is so far from volatilizing the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are ‘substantially’ ‘in themselves’. And only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at all, is it possible, in the field of such entities, to make accessible what is just present-at-hand and no more. By reason of their Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more, these latter entities can have their ‘properties’ defined mathematically in ‘functional concepts.’ Ontologically, such concepts are possible only in relation to entities whose Being has the character of pure substantiality. Functional concepts are never possible except as formalized substantial concepts. BTMR §18

Circumspective concern includes the understanding of a totality of involvements, and this understanding is based upon a prior understanding of the relationships of the “in-order-to”, the “towards-which”, the “towards-this”, and the “for-the-sake-of”. The interconnection of these relationships has been exhibited earlier as “significance”. Their unity makes up what we call the “world”. The question arises of how anything like the world in its unity with Dasein is ontologically possible. In what way must the world be, if Dasein is to be able to exist as Being-in-the-World? BTMR §69

The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, Present, and having been, is grounded in the ecstatical unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon [woraufhin] factically existing entities are essentially disclosed. With one’s factical Being-there, a potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the future, one’s ‘Being-already’ is disclosed in the horizon of having been, and that with which one concerns oneself is discovered in the horizon of the Present. The horizonal unity of the schemata of these ecstases makes possible the primordial way in which the relationships of the “in-orderto” are connected with the “for-the-sake-of”. This implies that on the basis of the horizonal constitution of the ecstatical unity of temporality, there belongs to that entity which is in each case its own “there”, something like’ a world that has been disclosed. BTMR §69