Hinterhersein, being-after, ἐφίεσθαι, ὄρεξις

“It appears that every τέχνη (knowing-one’s-way-around (Sichauskennen) something, in a definite mode of concern (Besorgen); the shoemaker understands how one makes a shoe, he knows his way around in it), every knowing-one’s-way (Auskenntnis) in a concern, every μέθοδος, every pursuing-of-a-matter (Einer-Sache-Nachgehen), being-on-the-way (Auf-dem-Wege-Sein) after a matter (yet again, a mode of being-oriented, of knowing-one’s-way-around) — in the same way, the concern and the occupying oneself (Sichvornehmen) with something that is to be settled, that is to be brought to an end through concern — all these modes of knowing-one’s-way-around and of concern about something, appear to be after some good (Gut).”¹ This ἐφίεσθαι, this “being-after,” (Hinterhersein) belongs to its being itself. As knowing-one’s-way-around, concern about something has an ἀγαθόν within itself, explicitly there. Concern is not something different than, and so only accidentally, a being-after. (GA18MT:47)

Insofar as the human being lets something be said, he is λóγον ἔχον (logon echon) in a new respect. He lets something be said insofar as he hears. He does not hear in the sense of learning something, but rather in the sense of having a directive for concrete practical concern. This ability-to-hear is a determination of ὄρεξις (orexis). Aristotle designates λóγον ἔχον in this second sense as also ἄλογον (alogon). The ὄρεξις is not speaking without qualification, but hearing. (GA18:111; GA18MT:76)

LÉXICO: (Hinterhersein->http://hyperlexikon.hyperlogos.info/modules/lexikon/search.php?option=1&term=Hinterhersein)

1. Eth. Nic. Α 1, 1094 a 1 sq. ↩