[…] Scheler  , who, as we have seen, claims that external objects are given to us directly in acts of perception, proposes that other persons are similarly directly or non-mediately given to a person in acts that he calls Nacherleben and Nachfühlen. These acts are especially visible in acts of sympathy, or Mitgefühl, which are founded in Nacherleben and Nachfühlen. Although the “nach” suggests that they come “after” a prior act of experiencing and feeling, this is not so. Scheler   argues that in these acts something of the “inner” experience of another person is immediately given as a “datum.” [KELLY, E. Structure and Diversity: Studies in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler  . Dordrecht: Springer, 1997]

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[…] The objects of the understanding reason are the expression of Erlebnisse (“lived experience” in Hodges’ translation), as they are presented in history and culture, because Life expresses and “objectifies” itself. History becomes for Dilthey   a series of objectified experiences which we can understand insofar as we can “re-live” (nacherleben, Hodges’ translation) them. Understanding, interpretation, hermeneutics are the art of deciphering signs of expression. [ARENDT  , H. Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism. Westminster: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011]

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