EREIGNIS

This page is read only. You can view the source, but not change it. Ask your administrator if you think this is wrong.
====== GA18:107 – ente que fala ======

The human being is a being that speaks. This definition is not invented by Aristotle. He says explicitly that with this definition he repeats an ἔνδοξον (endoxon), a δóξα (doxa), that has authority in Greek being-there itself. Already before Aristotle, the Greeks saw the human being as a being that speaks. Even the distinction between λóγον ἔχον (logon echon) and ἄλογον (alogon) goes back to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λóγοι (exoterikoi logoi) (EN1 1, 1102 a 26 sq.). Ἐξωτερικοὶ λóγοι: for a long time, one puzzled about what that really means. The opinion that was developed and propagated was that it referred to Aristotle’s dialogues since those writings were made public. This opinion did not last. The real sense of ἐξωτερικοὶ λóγοι was put forth for the first time by Diels in 1883, in the proceedings of the Berlin Academy. Jaeger adopted this meaning and made it fruitful for the determination of the literary character of Aristotle’s writings. Ἐξωτερικὸς λóγος is the mode of speaking outside of science, “how one carries on discourse,” and what is suppressed in this discoursing. Aristotle explicitly refers to this when he takes up the ἄλογον as the basic determination of human beings. That gives us an essential indication of the fact that, ultimately, if the determination of ζῷον λóγον ἔχον (zoon logon echon)is so fundamental, then this investigation of Aristotle’s must have an actual basis. It is not accidental that, in their natural self-interpretation, the Greeks defined the being-there of human beings as ζῷον λóγον ἔχον. (GA18:107; GA18MT:73-74)