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--- obra:ga65:nada-129 [25/08/2026 05:46] – created - external edit 127.0.0.1
+++ obra:ga65:nada-129 [25/08/2026 08:34] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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+===== O NADA (GA65:129) =====
+<tabbox Casanova>
+O seer “é”, visto a partir do ente, não o ente: aquilo que não é, e, assim, segundo o conceito habitual, o nada. Contra essa explicação, não é preciso trazer à tona nenhuma reserva, sobretudo se o ente for tomado como o elemento objetivo e presente à vista e o nada justamente como a completa negação do ente assim visado. Sendo que a própria negação tem o caráter do enunciado objetivo.
+Essa determinação “negativa” do “nada”, ligada ao conceito objetivo maximamente universal e vazio de “ser”, é, com certeza, o “que há de mais nulo”, pelo que qualquer um se vê imediata e facilmente tomado por aversão. Se nossa questão só dissesse respeito a essa nulidade admitida (de qualquer modo, porém, ainda não concebida), então ela não poderia pretender colocar a metafísica em questão e determinar a copertinência de seer e nada de maneira mais originária.
+O que aconteceria, contudo, se o seer mesmo fosse o que se subtrai e se essenciasse como recusa? Isso seria algo nulo ou a mais elevada doação? E se for mesmo somente por força dessa negatividade do próprio ser que o “nada” conquista plenamente aquele “poder” que se atribui a ele, de cuja consistência emerge todo “criar” (tornar-se ente do ente)?
+Se, então, o abandono do ser pertence ao “ente” da maquinação e da vivência, então é de se espantar se o “nada” for mal interpretado como o apenas nulo? (p. 242-243)
+<tabbox Fédier>
+Pris en vue à partir de l’étant, l’estre n’«est» pas étant: il « est » le non-étant et donc, selon le concept courant : le néant. À l’encontre de cette explication, il n’y a aucun doute à faire valoir, surtout si l’étant est pris comme ce qui est un objet là-devant, et le néant comme la négation complète d’un étant entendu en ce sens. Remarquons que cette négation-là présente elle-même le caractère de l’énoncé d’objectivité.
+Cette détermination «négative» du «rien», référée au concept d’objet le plus général et le plus vide, est sans conteste ce qui est affecté du maximum de « nullité »  –  devant quoi quiconque éprouve vite spontanément de la répugnance. Si notre questionnement concernait uniquement cette nullité admise (mais cependant encore non véritablement comprise), il ne lui serait guère permis de prétendre mettre en question la métaphysique et de déterminer de manière plus originale l’entr’appartenance d’estre et rien.
+Mais qu’en est-il si l’estre même était ce qui se retire en déployant sa pleine essence comme opposition d’un refus ? Cette dernière est-elle simple nullité, ou bien comble d’octroi ? Et n’est-ce pas en vertu de cette accointance de l’estre avec le rien que le « rien » regorge de cette « puissance » d’assignation à laquelle doit faire face et que doit soutenir toute « création » (faire l’étant devenir davantage étant).
+Si à présent l’abandonnement de l’être est partie prenante de l’« étant » de la fabrication et du vécu, est-il encore permis de s’étonner que le « rien » y soit interprété à tort et à travers comme nullité de néant. [GA65FR:282-283]
+<tabbox Emad & Maly>
+Seen from the perspective of beings, be-ing "is" Not a being: It is the not-being and thus, following the ordinary concept, the nothing. No reservation can be entertained regarding this explanation, especially since a being is taken as what is objective and extant and the nothing is taken as the total negating of a being so intended, whereby negating itself has the character of objective assertion.
+Considering the most general and emptiest concept of "being" as an object, this "negative" determination of the "nothing" is, however, the "most nihilating" to which everyone is at once and readily ill-disposed. If our inquiry were concerned merely with this pertinent (but nevertheless not yet grasped) nothingness, then this inquiry should not claim to put metaphysics into question and to determine more originarily how be-ing and the nothing belong together.
+But how would it be if be-ing itself were the self-withdrawing and would hold sway as refusal? Is this something insignificant or the highest gifting? And is it even above all by virtue of this not-character of be-ing itself that the "nothing" is full of that allotting "power" whose steadfastness gives rise to all "creating" (a being becoming more-being)?
+When now abandonment of being belongs to the "beings" of machination and live-experience, should we be surprised if the "nothing" is misconstrued as what is simply nihilating? [GA65EM:173-174]
+<tabbox Rojcewicz & Vallega-Neu>
+From the perspective of beings, beyng “is” not a being; it “is” a nonbeing and so, according to the usual conception, nothingness. This way of thinking is unassailable, especially if beings are taken in the sense of objects and objectively present things and nothingness signifies the utter negation of beings understood in that sense. Thereby negation itself has the character of an objective assertion.
+This “negative” determination of “nothingness,” in relation to the most general and emptiest objective concept of “being,” is indeed the “most negative,” and everyone immediately and readily feels antipathetic to it. If our inquiry concerned only this acknowledged (though not yet conceptualized) nullity, then such an inquiry could not claim to place metaphysics in question and to determine the belonging together of beyng and nothingness more originarily.
+But what if beyng itself were the self-withdrawing and essentially occurred as refusal? Is the latter a nullity or, rather, the highest gift? Indeed, is it not primarily on account of this negativity of beyng itself that “nothingness” is full of that assigning “power” the enduring of which is the origin of all “creating” (beings coming to be more fully)?
+If now the abandonment by being pertains to the “beings” of machination and lived experience, can it be surprising that “nothingness” is misinterpreted as sheer nullity? (GA65RV)
+<tabbox Original>
+Das Seyn »ist«, vom Seienden aus gesehen, Nicht das Seiende: das Nichtseiende und so nach dem gewöhnlichen Begriff das Nichts. Gegen diese Erklärung ist kein bedenken vorzubringen, zumal wenn das Seiende als das Gegenständliche und Vorhandene genommen wird und das Nichts eben als die völlige Verneinung des so gemeinten Seienden. Wobei das Verneinen Selbst den Charakter der gegenständlichen Aussage hat.
+Diese »negative« Bestimmung des »Nichts«, bezogen auf den so allgemeinsten und leersten Gegenstandsbegriff von »Sein«, ist allerdings das »Nichtigste«, dem Jedermann sogleich und leicht abgünstig wird. Sollte unser Fragen nur diese zugestandene (aber gleichwohl noch nicht begriffene) Nichtigkeit angehen, dann dürfte es nicht beanspruchen, die Metaphysik in Frage zu stellen und die Zusammengehörigkeit von Seyn und Nichts ursprünglicher zu bestimmen.
+Wie aber, wenn das Seyn selbst das Sichentziehende wäre und als die Verweigerung weste? Ist diese ein Nichtiges oder höchste Schenkung? Und ist gar erst Kraft dieser Mc&ihaftig-keit des Seyns selbst das »Nichts« voll jener zuweisenden »Macht«, deren Beständnis alles »schaffen« (Seienderwerden des Seienden) entspringt?
+Wenn nun die Seinsverlassenheit zum »Seienden« der Machenschaft und des Erlebens gehört, darf es da verwundern, wenn das »Nichts« als das nur Nichtige mißdeutet wird? [GA65:246]
+</tabbox>
+{{tag>GA65 nada}}