(Ek-sistenz->http://hyperlexikon.hyperlogos.info/modules/lexikon/search.php?option=1&term=Ek-sistenz), ex-sistência, ek-sistência, Ek-sistence, ex-sistente, ex-sistir

A Existenz de Heidegger ou, como ele passa a escrever, Ek-sistenz, não deve ser confundida com a “existência” de Sartre. “Existência” é a existentia no sentido da escolástica, que se opõe à “essência” ou essentia. Sartre simplesmente inverte a ordem destes termos. Ek-sistenz, como o próprio “ser”, é anterior à distinção entre “existência” e “essência”, e significa “colocar-se adiante” para dentro da “verdade do ser”. Por um lado, o humanismo superestima o papel do homem, colocando-o no centro do universo, e acessando tudo a partir do ponto-de-vista do homem. Por outro lado, subestima seu papel. Não reconhece que o homem não é apenas um ente dentre outros, mas o ente que, antes de tudo, abre um Mundo, ou os entes como um todo. Para o humanismo, o homem é a criança mimada que pensa que todos os brinquedos da loja são para ele. Para Heidegger, o homem é o empresário que fundou e sustenta a loja de brinquedos, resistindo à tentação de consumir seus conteúdos. (Inwood, DH)

In the twelfth century, in Richard of Saint-Victor’s canonical distinction ( De Trinitate (1148), 4.12.937C–983 ) we find the echo, amplified and transposed onto a metaphysical and theological level, of this first concrete meaning of the Latin verb exsisto:

 Now, with the term “existence” we can refer to both (of these) considerations: one concerning the essence’s nature and another concerning the nature of obtaining (it). I mean, (we can refer to) both (the consideration) in which (every being) seeks that which it is in itself and (the consideration) in which every being tries to know from where it derives its being. The word “existence” comes from the (Latin) verb existere. We observe that the term sistere refers to the first consideration. Equally, we can notice that by adding the preposition ex (the word) refers (in meaning) to the second consideration. When we say that something exists—( in the meaning of sistere )—those realities, which do not derive their being from themselves but have it from someone (else), are immediately excluded. (These realities) do not really “ex-ist”—so to speak—but they rather “in-sist,” that is, they are joined to some (other) subject. The term sistere, however, seems to be appropriate to both of them: both to that which subsists in some way, (and) to that which cannot subsist in any way; both to that which is necessarily subordinated and to that which cannot be (subordinated) in any way. In effect, the first condition is proper to the created nature, the second to the uncreated nature, since that which is not created subsists in itself in such a way that nothing in it can be found, as (if it were its own operating) subject. For this reason, the word sistere can refer to both the created and uncreated nature. The term ex-sistere, on its part, not only expresses the possession of being, but also the (being’s) coming from outside. (It expresses) the fact that one possesses its being because of someone (else). Indeed, this is shown in the compounded verb, by the preposition that is added to it. What does existere mean, in fact, if not sistere “from” ( = ex ) someone? That is, (what does it mean if not) receiving one’s own substantial being from someone (else)? Consequently, with this single verb existere—or with the single noun “existence”—we can intend both that which has to do with the object’s nature and that which refers to its own origin.  (BCDU)